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Taʿrīb, or Arabization, translates simply to “making Arab that which is not.” For 
the elite of independent Algeria, Arabization signified the policy of substituting Modern 
Standard Arabic (MSA) for French in politics, education, and public administration. 
Many elite also intended for MSA to replace Colloquial Arabic and Berber, the first 
languages of most Algerians, as the languages of daily communication. Yet six decades 
of Arabization did not eliminate the use of Colloquial Arabic, Tamazight, or French, with 
the former two dominating daily communication and French still commonly used in 
education, government, and business. Continued debate over if and how the Algerian 
government should pursue Arabization has led many scholars to interpret linguistic 
variation in Algeria as a conflict in which Modern Standard Arabic, Colloquial Arabic, 
Tamazight, and French all compete for official legitimacy.  
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This thesis examines the ideological foundations of Arabization in elite discourse 
from independence to the beginning of the Algerian civil war in 1991. Drawing on a 
range of primary source material including state-sponsored cultural reviews, 
autobiographies, and literary fiction, I analyze competing perspectives on Arabization in 
the works of leading Algerian writers, intellectuals, and political officials responsible for 
formulating and implementing language policy since independence. I seek to address the 
following question: what new explanations can be found for why Arabization formed and 
continues to form a central—and often controversial—dimension of official language 
policy in Algeria?  
This study complements current research on Arabization in the following ways. 
One, I expand the meaning of the term “Arabization” to designate not only a policy but 
an ideology intended to transform Algerians’ social, cultural, and political ethos. Two, I 
explore the relationship between perceived linguistic competency and socioeconomic 
mobility, a critique commonly leveled against the regime throughout Chadli Benjedid’s 
presidency and the civil war. This thesis will ultimately illuminate how Arabization 
created new relationships of domination and political control that continue to shape 
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A Note on the Translation and Transliteration of Arabic and French 
Names, Places, and Terms 
 
 
All translations from Arabic and French to English are my own. When needed, I 
have provided the definitions found in The Hans Wehr Dictionary of Modern Written 
Arabic, 4th Ed. The term tarbiya has been left in the original Arabic to distinguish it from 
taʿlīm, which most closely approximates “education” in English.   
All transliterations of Arabic names, places, and terms have been formatted 
according to the International Journal of Middle East Studies Transliteration System for 
Arabic. Exceptions have been made for alternative spellings commonly found in either 
French or English (Mostefa Lacheraf, for example, is used instead of Muṣṭafa al-Ashraf). 
Anglicized spellings are given when possible (“Arabization” rather than “Arabisation” is 
used throughout).    
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Introduction 
Darija, A “Langue de Rue” 
In July 2015, the Algerian ministry of education announced it would begin 
teaching Algerian Colloquial Arabic, or Darija, in primary schools. As a result of the 
proposal, students and teachers in first and second grade classrooms would be required to 
transition from Modern Standard Arabic to Darija as the primary language of instruction 
starting fall 2015.  
The proposal was one of many put forth during the National Conference on the 
Evaluation and Application of Educational Reform (la Conférence Nationale sur 
l’Évaluation de la Mise en Oeuvre de la Réforme de l’École) that took place in Algiers on 
the 25th and 26th of July 2015.1 Nouria Benghabrit-Remaoun, the current minister of 
national education, intended for the proposal to address “the reality” (al-wāqaʿ)” that 
students “lack mastery of their first language.” Because the grammatically complex 
Modern Standard Arabic (hereafter referred to as MSA) traditionally taught in schools 
exceeds the learning capacity of young children, she argued, students fall behind 
academically from an early age.2 Learning to express themselves in their native tongue 
would thus help students learn MSA with greater ease from the third grade onward. 
 The proposal received mixed reviews ranging from reluctant acceptance to 
outright condemnation. In a television program conducted by Ennahar TV, one 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Nourhane S., “La Darija Fait son Entrée dans le Cycle Fondamental,” Algérie-Focus, July 28, 2015, 
http://www.algerie-focus.com/2015/07/education-nationale-la-darija-fait-son-entree-dans-le-cycle-
fondamental/. 
2 “Benghabrit on Film: Darija Official in Pre-School and the First and Second Grades.” Youtube video, 
6:47. Posted August 4, 2015. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nydZnFTUlVo. 
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respondent critical of the policy dismissed Darija as a “street language” (langue de rue), 
claiming it had no place in the formal education system. Several individuals saw the 
proposal as unnecessary on the basis that children already developed full comprehension 
and usage of their dialects at home. Still others cited religious motivations for opposing 
the proposal. One respondent expressed concern that his children would not learn how to 
read and understand the Qur’an: “The Qur’an is written in fusḥa [Classical Arabic]. How 
will they understand it, by learning Darija? They won’t understand anything.”3 Another 
father asserted that schools should continue teaching MSA only because he wanted his 
sons to have the best possible academic and professional future.  
Those neutral or mildly favorable toward the proposal agreed with Benghrabit-
Remaoun that learning Darija first would make students more likely to develop 
competency in MSA later on. “Darija is the language they [children] understand,” one 
respondent explained. “I prefer Darija because the best tongue is your mother tongue. At 
home, we speak to each other in Darija and so it is difficult for them to understand qul, 
qal (“to say”), etc.”4  
 The controversy surrounding this initiative reflects a decades-long absence of 
consensus in Algeria over which language or languages should be granted official 
legitimacy and which should not. In accordance with Article 5 of the constitution of 1963, 
Arabic remains Algeria’s national and official language with Tamazight recently adopted 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Concerning this individual’s response, it is important to keep in mind that the Modern Standard Arabic 
taught in schools closely resembles the Arabic of the Qur’an. 
4 These responses were solicited by Ennahar TV, a private Algerian television channel. The full program 
can be found at: “al-Taʿlīm bi al-Dārija li Talāmīdh al-Ibtidāʾiyy fii al-Dukhūl al-Madrasiyy al-Qādim.” 
Youtube video, 9:08. Posted July 29, 2015. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m1J2NBNuiRU. 
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in January 2016 as “an” official language.5 Contemporary researchers will find evidence 
of linguistic plurality gaining acceptance among certain members of the elite and the 
broader population. Extensive print material in official documents, newspapers, and 
broadcasts continues to be produced in MSA, French, or both with bilingual publications 
still common. Colloquial Arabic and Tamazight are also finding new outlets for 
expression in television, music, and online forums. For example, the official website of 
Algérie Presse Service, the government’s premier media channel, now offers users the 
option of browsing their website in Arabic, French, English, and three different scripts of 
Tamazight.6  
This gradual opening towards linguistic plurality has not always been the case for 
the Algerian cultural and political elite. Since Algeria obtained independence from 
France in 1962, the ruling elite has claimed to pursue Arabization, a set of measures 
formulated with the aim of replacing French, Colloquial Arabic, and Tamazight with 
Modern Standard Arabic as the sole medium of oral and written communication. At 
independence, few members of the elite outwardly opposed Arabization. They saw it as 
an important symbolic gesture marking Algeria’s break from its colonial past as well as a 
necessary step in aligning Algeria with the Arab revolutionary world. Algeria’s violent 
colonial history, the elite’s deeply held beliefs in linguistic purity and authenticity, and 
frantic attempts to consolidate political power all provided the political leadership with 
strong impetus to pursue linguistic change on a revolutionary scale. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 “Avant Projet de Révision et de la Constitution,” Algérie Presse Service, last modified 28 December, 
2015, http://www.aps.dz/images/doc/PROJET-DE%20REVISION-DE-LA-CONSTITUTION-28-
DECEMBRE-2015.pdf. 
6 Algérie Presse Service is published online at: http://www.aps.dz. 
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In this thesis, I explore the ideological underpinnings of Arabization in Algeria 
from independence to the beginning of the civil war in 1991. I draw on a range of 
primary source material including newspaper articles, literary fiction, autobiographies, 
and state-published journals such as al-Thaqāfa (“Culture”) and al-Aṣalah 
(“Authenticity”) to assess how and why Arabization has continued to spark fierce debate 
over language and national identity.  
This thesis is divided into three parts. In Part I, I explore Arabization’s 
relationship to the broader “cultural revolution,” an ideological program designed to rid 
Algerians of the psychological vestiges of colonialism by using the Arabic language and 
Islam to reconnect them with their so-called cultural authenticity. I address the 
importance of Arabization in revealing the “true personality” of Algeria as many political 
officials such as then-president Houari Boumediène would refer to it at the time. 
“Without the recuperation of this essential and important element that is the national 
language,” Boumediène argued, “our efforts will remain in vain, our personality 
incomplete, and our body without a soul.”7 Part II will address the unique role of 
Arabization in the national education system, the institution that provided the most direct 
line of access between the regime and ordinary citizens. National education provides 
unique insight into how Arabization was implemented as much of the information 
available on Arabization exists in the form of policy changes made to the education 
system. In Part III, I analyze elite ambivalence in implementing Arabization as a major 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Hind Amel Mostari, “A Sociolinguistic Perspective on Arabisation and Language Use in Algeria,” 
Language Problems & Language Planning 28 (2004): 26. 
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contributing factor to the breakdown of consensus within the political leadership 
following the rise to power of president Chadli Benjedid in 1979.  
 
Historical Background 
Following independence in 1962, the nascent Algerian state found itself in 
shambles after seven years of warfare and 132 years of repressive colonial rule. In 
response, the new political leadership adopted a broad set of measures designed to 
develop Algeria as rapidly as possible into a modern nation state. In line with 
Abdelhamid Ben Badis’ famous slogan,“Islam is my religion; Arabic is my language; 
Algeria is my fatherland,”8 the leadership undertook the process of Arabization (taʿrīb) in 
which Arabic was designated Algeria’s sole official language and was to replace French 
in business, government, and education. 
Throughout the independence war (1954-1962), the National Liberation Front 
(Front de Libération Nationale, FLN) outlined their plans to officiate Arabic following 
independence. The November 1 proclamation (1954), considered the first official 
document published by the FLN, called for the recognition of an Algerian nationalism 
distinct from French Algeria, an entity in denial of the “history, geography, language, 
religion, and mores of the Algerian people.”9 Although the term Arabization did not 
appear in this early document, it nonetheless provided an initial plan for the displacement 
of French should the FLN win the war.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Abdelhamid Ben Badis quoted in Mohamed Benrabah, Language Conflict in Algeria (Bristol: 
Multilingual Matters, 2013): 43.  
9 Mohammed Harbi and Gilbert Meynier, Le FLN: Documents et Histoire, 1954-1962 (Paris: Librarie 
Arthème Fayard, 2004): 36-38. 
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As Gilbert Meynier has shown, actual language use among the wartime FLN was 
variable and flexible, adapting to wartime needs and “bending to the mysteries of the 
bureaucracy.”10 With the exception of outspoken proponents of Arabization such as 
Ahmed Tawfiq al-Madani and Abdelhamid Mehri, the majority of combatants were not 
concerned with questions of language and culture during the war itself.11 For their part, 
many among the francophone elite considered the question of Arabic to be a religious 
issue and would not make Arabization a serious priority despite much rhetoric to the 
contrary.12 For some militants, however, Arabization did form an important ideological 
dimension of the war. In one 1961 directive, FLN commandant Si Mohammed outlined 
the importance of Arabic in the national liberation struggle as follows: 
Language is an element of reconciliation between men. Above the 
diversity of local languages and dialects, the nation, in order to be unified 
and organized, must possess a national language. Our national language is 
Arabic. It is the language of our religion, culture, and historical past.13 
 
Si Mohammed’s emphasis on using Arabic to achieve political unity marked how many 
members of the arabisant elite would justify the importance of Arabization in the ensuing 
years. Though Arabization may not have been a central tenant of the wartime FLN’s 
platform, Si Mohammed’s explanation indicates that some combatants were considering 
the place of language long before independence.  
The Algerian Constitution of 1963 is worth exploring in detail because it provides 
the first piece of evidence regarding formal calls for the institutionalization of Arabic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Gilbert Meynier, Histoire Intérieure du FLN (Paris: Librarie Arthème Fayard, 2002): 502. 
11 Ibid., 507. 
12 Ibid., 507-508. 
13 Ibid., 500. 
	   7	  
after the war. Articles four and five designate Islam the religion of the state and Arabic 
the official language.14 While this version of the constitution did not stipulate what kind 
of Arabic characterized the “official” language, it is safe to say “Arabic” denoted strictly 
Modern Standard Arabic15 for reasons I will discuss later on in this thesis. It was less 
clear how the leadership would ensure the erasure of French. In fact, Article 73 allowed 
for the continued use of French until Arabization could be realized: 
The provisions of this constitution not withstanding, the actual 
achievement of Arabization on the territory of the Republic must take 
place in the shortest possible time; however, the French language may be 
used provisionally with the Arabic language. 
 
Article 73 raises several questions regarding the future of Arabization in Algeria: What 
might “the actual achievement of Arabization” entail? What length of time constitutes the 
“shortest possible time?” Five years? Twenty years? How “provisionally” might the 
French language be used? The lack of clarity underscored in Article 73 is crucial for 
understanding the development of Arabization in Algeria because it reflects the 
ambivalence of the senior leadership regarding its desirability and possibility for 
implementation from the onset, an ambivalence that has continued to frame the political 
leadership’s approach through today. 
As first president of Algeria, Ahmed Ben Bella’s leadership was integral in 
making Arabization a formal policy goal and defining its objectives. On October 5, 1962, 
two weeks after his victory in the September 20th National Assembly elections, Ben Bella 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 “The Algerian Constitution,” Middle East Journal 17, no. 4 (1963): 446. 
15 In the source material presented in this thesis, Modern Standard Arabic is also commonly referred to as 
Classical Arabic, Literary Arabic, Formal Arabic, or Fuṣḥa. The term Modern Standard Arabic is retained 
to distinguish the official bureaucratic Arabic of the Algerian government from Qur’anic Arabic.  
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announced that Arabic would be taught alongside French in elementary schools. He 
justified the initiative in a meeting with Algerian instructors less than one year later 
during which he insisted on the urgency of promoting Arabic, “the basis of Arab-Islamic 
culture,”  through Arabization programs that would allow “[Algerians] to reconcile [their 
country] which has been depersonalized, with its history and its past, that is to say, with 
itself…”16 This notion of reconciling the country with an Arab-Islamic past or “the 
Algerian” (often used in the masculine singular) with his “true personality” came to 
characterize how proponents of Arabization explained its importance in the ensuing 
decades. 
For the largely French-educated and non-Arabophone elite of the new 
independent government, however, Arabizing Algeria proved a daunting task.17 Aware of 
the challenge of transitioning from French to Arabic too quickly, Ben Bella echoed the 
stipulation set forth in Article 73 at the same teachers’ meeting discussed in the previous 
paragraph: “Having said this, I do not at all fail to recognize the importance of the French 
language, which is a factor of enrichment for us.”18 Ben Bella himself doubted the 
efficacy and possibility of successfully implementing the upcoming programs, warning 
that it might not be possible to replace French with Arabic in all political and economic 
sectors.19  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Firoozeh Kashani-Sabet, “The Swinging Pendulum: Linguistic Controversy in Post-Colonial Algeria,” 
Middle Eastern Studies 32 (1996): 269.  
17 Amel Mostari, “A Sociolinguistic Perspective on Language Use in Algeria,” 27. 
18 John Ruedy, Modern Algeria: the Origins and Development of a Nation, 2nd ed. (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 2005): 224. 
19 Ibid. 
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The actual implementation of Arabization was achieved first and foremost 
through public schooling. Between 1962 and 1971, the national education system 
continued to follow the model set in place by the French colonial school.20 This model, as 
Ruedy describes, was “designed to provide basic verbal and quantitative skills for the 
majority while offering opportunities for the very talented to climb higher up a sharply 
pitched educational pyramid.”21 Between 1962-1978, students were required to take a 
final examination at the end of the primary cycle whose failure rates ranged between 48 
and 75 percent.22 Language competency in MSA, but especially French, played a central 
role in determining success rates, where students possessing oral and written competency 
in French found themselves far more likely to achieve social mobility and economic 
success.23 
By 1970, however, the Ministry of Education and the Direction of Planning 
adopted several educational reforms aimed to promote student retention in public schools 
and combat “the profound dependence” of Algeria’s education system on the French 
model.24 According to Mohamed Benrabah, these educational reforms had three 
objectives: the democratization of education to enforce universal schooling, the 
promotion of science and technology, and the implementation of Arabization.25 French 
was thereafter taught as a foreign language beginning in the fourth grade, a policy that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Saada, El Hadi. “Difficulté d’Acquisition des Langues Scolaires et Crise d’Identité chez les Élèves en Fin 
d’Études Primaires en Algérie,” doctoral dissertation, Université de Genève, 1983: 109. 
21 Ruedy, Modern Algeria, 227. 
22 Ibid., 227. 
23 Ibid., 226. 
24 Ibid., 110. 
25 Mohamed Benrabah, “Language Maintenance and Spread: French in Algeria,” International Journal of 
Francophone Studies 10 (2007): 199. 
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lasted through the 1990s.26 El Hadi Saada has described the amendments set forth in 1971 
as “reform without rupture” in the sense that the associated Quadrennial Plan, whose aim 
was to establish a more rigorous curriculum, distance Algerian schooling from the French 
pedagogical tradition, and lower the costs imposed by mass schooling, never fully 
resolved the education system’s associated “losses” (déperditions) of illiteracy and semi-
lingualism which left the schools in veritable disorder.27 
 
Towards a Theoretical Understanding of Arabization: Arabization as 
Ideology 
To establish a sound theoretical basis for the following study, it is first necessary 
to address how Arabization is defined in existing scholarship. Mohamed Benrabah 
understands Arabization to mean “the language policy implemented to displace French 
altogether” and to promote Arabic monolingualism in place of Arabic-French 
bilingualism.28 He views Arabization as an important objective of the “cultural revolution” 
whose aim was to “link Algeria to the rest of the Arab (revolutionary) world.”29 
According to Benrabah, Arabization as a formal policy implemented in education and 
state institutions has succeeded in certain domains and “failed” in others.30 His studies are 
particularly useful for identifying where and when certain languages are used, explaining 
that Arabic is used predominantly in the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Religious 
Affairs, and the Ministry of Education while French, “the language of higher social status 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Ibid., 194. 
27 Saada, “Difficulté d’Acquisition des Langues Scolaires,” 110-113. 
28 Benrabah, “Language Maintenance and Spread,” 199. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid. 
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and prestige,” still dominates higher education and ministries where Arabization is 
incomplete or “partial.”31 
Gilbert Grandguillaume has highlighted important differences between academic 
disciplines in regards to how Arabization is defined and understood. For linguists, 
Arabization denotes simply the substitution of French for Arabic in all domains. 
Similarly, sociolinguists tend to highlight the “dispossession” among French speakers at 
the hands of the Arabophone elite, viewing language choice as a kind of zero-sum game. 
For anthropologists, however, Arabization centers above all on questions of cultural 
authenticity where speakers perceive language choice as an expression of an identity or 
mindset. Grandguillaume draws on all three approaches to discern the “double 
substitution” of Arabization: the adoption of Arabic in place of French, “the language of 
cultural alienation,” and the erasure of dialects to minimize linguistic diversity and assure 
civic loyalty to the state.32 Grandguillaume’s study marks an important contribution in 
understanding Arabization as a process designed to marginalize Colloquial Arabic and 
Tamazight in addition to French.    
Algerian sociologist Khaoula Taleb Ibrahimi moves toward understanding 
Arabization as a “concept” made up of various “components” (composantes).33  
According to Taleb Ibrahimi, Arabization translates literally as “to make Arab that which 
is not.”34 While the term’s classical meaning signified the transfer of Greek, Persian, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Ibid., 195. 
32 Gilbert Grandguillaume, “Arabisation et Langues Maternelles dans le Contexte National au Maghreb,” 
International Journal of the Sociology of Language 87 (1991): 49-50. 
33 Khaoula Taleb Ibrahimi, Les Algériens et Leur(s) Langue(s) (Algiers: Les Éditions El Hikma, 1995): 
252-253. 
34 Ibid., 249. 
	   12	  
Indian works into Arabic, Arabization in the 20th century became understood as “a way of 
affirming Arab identity (the language being perceived as a fundamental attribute of the 
Arab personality, the defining trait of Arabism):”35  
After North African countries achieved independence, Arabization took on 
a significance that transcended the strictly technical aspect described 
below. In expanding this aspect into a general Arabization-translation that 
permits the Arabic language to definitively re-take its place in society and 
to liberate all aspects of daily and communal life from the foreign 
language (that of the former colonizer), Arabization became a synonym 
for revitalization (ressourcement), a return to authenticity, a recuperation 
of the Arab identity that could not be realized without the restoration of 
the Arabic language…[it became] the fundamental condition for 
reconciling [Algeria] with itself.36  
 
Arabization in this sense meant both a linguistic policy and a cultural, social, and political 
identification with Arabism, a “process” and an “objective” “founded on the concept of 
the state, defined essentially by its geographic, political, but especially cultural and 
linguistic unity.”37 
All of these different meanings point to the possibility of developing new 
methodological frameworks for analyzing Arabization’s multifaceted dimensions. As this 
paper will show, Arabization incorporated political, economic, social, and religious 
objectives that are often difficult to separate from one another. For this reason, I propose 
to examine Arabization within the framework of ideology. In other words, I evaluate 
Arabization as a set of deeply held beliefs about what is desirable, necessary, or ethical 
regarding the Arabic language and its perceived rightful place in Algerian politics, 
culture, and society. This approach moves beyond analyzing Arabization as a series of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid., 252. 
37 Ibid., 255. 
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policy measures or a “return” to the past toward an interpretation where, as Kristen 
Brustad explains, actual language usage is less important than “the maintenance of the 
ideal.”38 
One way to interpret Arabization as an ideology is to consider MSA as a language 
whose speakers believe it to exist in an ideal form. James Milroy argues that participants 
in a standard language culture commonly hold the view that when two or more linguistic 
variants exist, only one is correct and the evaluation of correctness does not require 
justification—it is “common sense” among speakers that the “correct” view is also the 
“responsible,” “decent,” and “moral” view.39 Those who believe their language to exist in 
a standardized form also tend to entrust various authorities (grammarians, teachers, 
schools, etc) with safeguarding the standard use from decay or corruption: 
The canonical form of the language is a precious inheritance that has been 
built up over generations, not by the millions of native speakers, but by a 
select few who have lavished loving care upon it, polishing, refining, and 
enriching it until it has become a fine instrument of expression… 
 
Milroy’s analysis is useful for understanding Arabization because it sheds light on the 
Algerian educated elite’s perceived role in protecting MSA from both foreign influence 
and the perceived non-standard usages of Algerians themselves. Standard language 
ideology also alludes to a kind of sacredness associated with the perceived canonical 
language, characteristics often affiliated with MSA and its adherence to a strict 
grammatical and lexical code. While debates regarding suitable pedagogical methods for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Kristen Brustad, “Standard Language Ideology and the Construction of Modern Standard Arabic” (paper 
presented at the Workshop on Language, Literary and the Social Construction of Authority). 
39 James Milroy, “Language Ideologies and the Consequences of Standardization,” Journal of 
Sociolinguistics 5, no. 4 (2001): 535-536. 
	   14	  
teaching Arabic in public schools have continued to take place, overt critiques 
challenging MSA as the correct or ideal register of Arabic are almost nonexistent in elite 
discourse. When they are, as the proposal to teach Darija in public schools demonstrated, 
they are fiercely denounced and accused of corrupting the purity and sanctity of the 
Arabic language.  
The concept of language as symbolic power as understood by Pierre Bourdieu 
will factor heavily into my analysis of Arabization in this thesis as his work provides 
unique ways of thinking about language as a form of social capital. In his analysis of 
language as an “economy of linguistic exchange” (économie des échanges linguistiques), 
Bourdieu offers a useful method for interpreting the institutionalization of Arabic as an 
“official language” and its status as the language of legitimacy, state power, and 
economic domination.  
Analyzing Arabization through the lens of Bourdieu’s work will complement 
existing research in several ways. His work explores the relationship between the official 
language and linguistic legitimacy, a central concept shaping the debate surrounding 
Arabization in Algeria today. “To speak of language, without further specification,” he 
writes, “is to tacitly accept the official definition of the official language of a unified 
political entity.”40 Made obligatory in official spaces such as the school, public 
administration, and political institutions, the official language is deeply embedded in the 
formation of the state which provides it with “the institutional conditions necessary for its 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Ibid., 27. 
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codification and imposition.”41 The official language becomes the “dominant” language 
not in terms of its number of speakers, but by nature of its symbolic affiliation with the 
state and other institutions of power. Education plays an especially important role here. 
For the dominant language to reproduce itself, the school must be seen as the principle 
line of access to political and economic power.42  
Finally, Bourdieu offers valuable insight into how linguistic domination produces 
and reproduces social and economic inequalities. These inequalities, Bourdieu and Luc 
Boltanski argue, come to the fore in the education market (le marché scolaire) and the 
labor market (le marché du travail) where competency in the dominant language provides 
access to social and material benefits.43 Linguistic capital awards those who develop 
competency in the dominant language with a “profit of distinction” from non-speakers, 
those who know only the patois of the common people. As Bourdieu describes:  
All symbolic domination supposes on the part of those who submit to it a 
form of complicity that is not passive submission to an exterior constraint, 
nor free adherence to its values. The recognition of legitimacy of the 
official language has nothing to do with an intentionally expressed, 
deliberated, and revocable belief, nor an intentional act of accepting a 
“norm”; it is embedded, rather, in the practical state of dispositions 
imperceptibly implanted, across a long and slow process of acquisition, by 
the sanctions of the linguistic market and which find themselves thus fitted, 
outside of all cynical calculation and all perceived conscious restraint, to 
material and symbolic profit where the laws of formation of prices 
characteristic of a certain market objectively allow those holding it to 
possess a certain linguistic capital.44  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Ibid., 26-27. 
42 Ibid., 34. 
43 Pierre Bourdieu and Luc Boltanksi, “La Fétichisme de la Langue,” Actes de la Recherche en Sciences 
Sociales 1 (1975): 12.  
44 Bourdieu, Ce que Parler Veut Dire, 36. 
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Bourdieu’s work thus provides useful theoretical grounding for analyzing Arabization as 
a policy articulated and implemented exclusively by the Algerian elite. His work also 
promises to shed light on how and why linguistic competency plays a major role in 
shaping contemporary class distinctions and social inequalities. Reading Arabization 
through the lens of symbolic domination will allow for a more nuanced understanding of 
the motivations—and hesitations—of the elite responsible for implementing Arabization 
since the early 1960s.  
 
A Note on Sources 
This thesis makes use of a variety of  sources to provide a fuller picture of how 
the Algerian elite conceived of Arabization. I have selected primary source material from 
authors based both inside and outside of Algeria. Finally, it was my aim to collect sources 
published in both Arabic and French, as many of the elites surveyed in this thesis often 
wrote in both languages throughout their careers.  
The two bi-monthly periodicals cited frequently throughout this paper, al-Thaqāfa 
and al-Aṣāla, consist of collections of essays written by various intellectuals from Algeria 
as well as the broader Middle East and North Africa. Both journals were reviewed and 
published primarily by the Ministry of Information and Culture. They were also 
published exclusively in Arabic, with the exception of citations, and articles originally 
published in French were translated into Arabic by the edition’s editor. This author was 
unable to determine the exact publication date ranges for either journal and is not aware 
of their current publication status.  
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  The information presented in the following print sources show the extent to 
which a large portion of elite debate surrounding Algeria’s language question took place 
in critical essays, periodicals, autobiographies, and creative fiction, all of which formed a 
lively and often contentious discourse on Arabization that has persisted in many ways. 
While a comprehensive history and analysis of language in Algeria is beyond the scope 
of this particular essay, I hope that the ideas presented here will spark further research on 
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Chapter I: Language as Culture, Culture as Language: Recovering 
Algeria’s “True Personality” Under Ben Bella & Boumediène, 1962-
1978 
 
Our thoughts focus on the organization of groups, our relationships with the outside; friction is 
inevitable, given the population’s mistrust towards us, due to our poor titles of revolutionaries who 
left the ranks in the last quarter hour, almost as the prophet Lacoste had predicted, even if he did 
not know that Arab-Muslim Algeria would overtake French Algeria to pacify Berbers (la 
Berbérie).45 
 
 -Kateb Yacine, Le Polygone Étoilé (1966) 
 
 
Arabization & Algeria’s Cultural Revolution   
 
 This chapter explores how and why Arabization became a major goal of the 
broader cultural revolution after independence in 1962. Drawing on the works of Ahmed 
Ben Bella, Ahmed Taleb Ibrahimi, Houari Boumadiène, and other members of the elite 
active during the national transition period,46 I examine how the elite sought to reshape 
national culture as a way of transforming Algerian society into one politically, religiously, 
and linguistically uniform “personality” (shakhṣiyya). 
Part of what made Arabization a salient feature of the FLN’s political philosophy 
in the early years of independence was its instrumental role in the cultural revolution, a 
continued struggle of the liberation war. The cultural revolution aimed to formulate a 
distinct new national identity in order to counter the process of deculturation which the 
elite believed to be a collective psychological deficiency brought on by colonial rule. As 
Benrabah succinctly summarizes:   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Kateb Yacine, Le Polygone Étoilé (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1966): 99.  
46 Benrabah describes this period as the time during which the Arabic language was most assertively 
implemented in education and government. See Mohamed Benrabah, “Language-in-Education Planning in 
Algeria: Historical Development and Current Issues,” Language Policy 6 (2007): 225. 
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The regime’s Arabization drive was intended to accompany a ‘Cultural 
Revolution’—revive the Arabo-Islamic culture and identity and ‘go back 
to’ to [typography error in original] what ideologues believed to be the 
‘essence’ of Algeria, that is an Arabic-speaking country—and to link 
Algeria to the rest of the Arab (revolutionary) world, regarded then as the 
cultural counter-weight to the imperialist West, headed by France.47  
 
In this context, Arabic was to become the primary vessel for transmitting a set of values 
intended to transform Algerians into legitimate members of the emerging Arab, Islamic, 
and national socialist state. Arabization was doubtless a powerful symbolic gesture of 
Algeria’s break with its colonial past, but there was also more at stake. How did Algeria’s 
ruling elite envision the role of language in culture, and what might this relationship 
reveal about the political debates that took shape in the first two decades of statehood?  
A detailed exploration of Algerian national culture is needed here because while 
existing scholarship recognizes the cultural revolution as an important justification for 
pursuing Arabization, less attention has been paid to disagreement among the elite 
regarding the goals of this revolution and the place of language within it. Indeed, Gilbert 
Meynier has shown how the FLN at independence never fully dealt with the “problem of 
culture” for fear of provoking further political divisions.48 Moreover, this discussion on 
national culture will show how Arabization represented the creation of a new national 
identity rather than a return to the past. This discussion will ultimately show how the elite 
used the question of Arabization to mask ongoing political and ideological debates during 
this time.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Benrabah, “Language Maintenance and Spread,” 199. 
48 Meynier has argued that throughout the independence war, the FLN avoided dealing head-on with 
questions of culture by allowing the continued running of Qur’anic schools and ignoring the Berber 
question altogether. See Meynier, Histoire Intérieure du F.L.N., 690. 
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Abdelhamid Ben Badis, the AUMA, & Challenges to French Cultural 
Assimilation 
It is impossible to understand the cultural revolution without first acknowledging 
the historical influence of Muslim theologian and intellectual Abdelhamid Ben Badis 
(1889-1940), the founder and long-time leader of the Association of Algerian Muslim 
ʿUlamāʾ (Association Des Uléma Musulmans Algériens, Jamʿiyyat al-ʿUlamāʾ al-
Muslimīn al-Jazāʾiriyyīn). Ben Badis created the AUMA with the goal of providing 
Islamic education and Arabic language instruction to Algerians as an alternative option to 
the French colonial education system. Condemning the assimilationist discourse set forth 
by the French colonial administration, the AUMA was especially influential in 
formulating a unique cultural ideology to accompany their slogan “Islam is our religion, 
Algeria our country, Arabic our language.”49  
Under Ben Badis, the AUMA sought to challenge what they perceived to be the 
religious, cultural, and linguistic threat of direct French rule as well as less direct forms 
of French cultural influence promoted by Messali Hadj, Ferhat Abbas, and other évolués, 
the emerging technocratic and French-educated Algerian elite. Emphasizing the 
importance of religious purity and ethics, the ʿUlamāʾ advocated for a “return” to Islamic 
norms and principles.50 In February 1936, Ben Badis responded to Ferhat Abbas’ defense 
of Algeria as part of metropolitan France with the following statement:51  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Kashani-Sabet, “The Swinging Pendulum,” 267. 
50 Ibid. 
51 In the early years of his political career, Ferhat Abbas (1899-1985), a chemist from Sétif, is known for 
having supported Algeria remaining a part of metropolitan France. He is credited with publishing the 
following text in 1936: “If I had discovered the Algerian nation, I should be a nationalist, and I should not 
blush for my crime. However, I will not die for the Algerian fatherland because this fatherland does not 
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We ourselves have examined the pages of history and the current situation. 
And we have found that the Algerian and Muslim nation has been formed 
and exists in the same way as all other nations of the earth. This 
community has its history, illustrated by the highest actions; it has its 
religious and linguistic unity, it has its own cultures, its traditions, and its 
characteristics…Moreover, this Algerian Muslim nation is not France. It 
cannot be France. It does not want to be France. It could not even be 
France if it wanted it. It is a nation very remote from France by its 
language, its customs, its race and its religion and it does not want to 
integrate into France.52 
 
Unlike Messali Hadj and other nationalist évolués, whose focused primarily on ending 
colonial rule, the AUMA’s platform under Ben Badis centered more on the threat of 
French cultural hegemony which they perceived as foreign to the history, language, and 
norms of Algeria. These ʿUlamāʾ often clashed with more militant nationalists over the 
use of violence to achieve independence. In fact, the AUMA fell out of favor during the 
1940s with younger students, even those educated in religious institutions, as their elders 
were sometimes deemed too moderate relative to the bolder calls to action set forth by 
Messali Hadj and his PPA (Parti du Peuple Algérien, ḥizb al-shaʿb al-jazāʾiriyy).53   
Nonetheless, the cultural ideology developed by the AUMA had a lasting impact 
on shaping linguistic debates in Algeria. James McDougall has highlighted the role the 
AUMA played in amassing “the cultural authority to define the ‘true religion’ in Algeria” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
exist. I haven’t found it. I have sought it in history, I have questioned the living and the dead; I have been to 
cemeteries…all in vain.” He eventually retracted the statement and become a supporter of the nationalist 
cause. Ferhat Abbas quoted in Tanya Matthews, War in Algeria: Background for Crisis (New York: 
Fordham University Press, 1961): 20-21. 
52 Abdelhamid Ben Badis quoted in Saliha Belmessous, Assimilation & Empire: Uniformity in French & 
British Colonies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013): 186. 
53 James McDougall, “Dream of Exile, Promise of Home: Language, Education, and Arabism in Algeria,” 
International Journal of Middle East Studies 43 (2011): 254-257.  
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between 1931 and 1956-1957 when the association ceased formally operating.54 The 
ideology of the ʿUlamāʾ filled a void left by the colonial administration because it 
provided educational opportunities to Algerians excluded from colonial schools. The 
limited number of Algerians who did enroll in colonial schools often came from families 
of local notables or those working in the colonial administration.55 Harsh socioeconomic 
circumstances and France’s aggressive assimilationist rhetoric encouraged many 
Algerians to seek alternative sources of knowledge:  
In comparison with the disastrous, expropriated and miserable conditions 
of what Tawfiq al-Madani called ‘the very many children who live, 
ignorant and abandoned of all morality in the streets’ of the cities of 
French Algeria, the notion east of ‘urūba (Arabism), ‘arabiyya (the Arabic 
language) and original Islam was a place of escape, of morality and 
improvement, of purity and purification.56  
 
As McDougall shows here, the AUMA shaped its cultural program by promoting a 
universalist “Arabism” as the solution to Algeria’s perceived moral paucity.  
While members of the AUMA doubtless held varying opinions on specific issues, 
we can discern several currents than ran central to their cultural platform. One, as 
McDougall described, their educational philosophy centered first and foremost on the 
defense of Islam and the Arabic language.57 After independence, many former members 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 James McDougall, History and the Culture of Nationalism in Algeria (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2006), 13-14. 
55 In line with the Islamic reformist movement of his time, Abdelhamid Ben Badis (1890-1940) is credited 
with establishing a unique brand of religious schools that provided Arabic language instruction to many of 
Algeria’s future elites. Following his death in 1940, Sheikh Bashir Ibrahimi assumed the leadership of the 
AUMA and its numerous medersas (madāris), overseeing 90 schools by 1947 and 181 by 1954. The 
outbreak of war in 1954 led to a dramatic reduction in the number of schools available, with few of them in 
operation by 1957. See Charlotte Courreye, “L’École Musulmane Algérienne de Ibn Bâdîs dans les Années 
1930, de l’Alphabétisation de Tous comme Enjeu Politique,” Revue des Mondes Musulmans et de la 
Méditerranée 136 (2014).        
56 McDougall, History and the Culture of Nationalism in Algeria, 57. 
57 Courreye, “L’École Musulmane Algérienne.” 
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of the AUMA such as Ahmed Tawfiq Al-Madani and Ahmed Taleb Ibrahimi were 
assigned to key posts in the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Religious Affairs 
where they were granted political power to shape intellectual debates on culture and 
language. They brought with them an educational experience firmly rooted in the 
tradition of Ben Badis and his successor, Sheikh Bashir Ibrahimi. The AUMA were also 
responsible for making Arabic a language of instruction for those who attended their 
schools. Many of the Arabophone elite had learned Arabic at AUMA schools from an 
early age and had pursued higher education at Zeitouna University (Tunis), Al-Azhar 
(Cairo), and other Arab universities throughout Egypt, Iraq, and Syria.58  
Most importantly, the AUMA created a new class of arabisant intellectuals 
prepared to challenge their secular nationalist adversaries. After independence, these 
AUMA-educated elite came together as an identifiable Arabophone cultural and religious 
intelligentsia. Commonly referred to in Arabic as al-muʿarrabīn, this group of 
intellectuals, writers, and politicians congregated around the use of Arabic as a tool of 
expression, a vision centered on the notion of Arab-Islamic civilization, and a kind of 
“rationality” (al-aʿql al-bayāni) rooted in language and religion.59 Staunch supporters of 
Arabization, they took on a symbolic role distinct from the francisants, who came 
together as their own bureaucratic and technocratic elite.  
Despite their differences, these two currents closely resembled one another in 
regards to how they viewed themselves as responsible for social, economic, and cultural 
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direction “from above.”60 Both members of the ʿUlamāʾ and the technocratic elite “saw 
themselves as invested with a mission to direct, develop, and lead their ‘ignorant’ and 
‘backward’ brothers once independence was achieved.”61 The tendency of both 
ideological currents to view the appropriate political direction of Algeria in “absolutes”62 
—and to see themselves as the sole legitimate authorities in determining those 
absolutes—made it such that language became a proxy for broader struggles over 
political supremacy in the ensuing decades.   
 
“We Feel Arab, But Our Metric System is Not Arab”: Ahmed Ben Bella on 
Arabization, 1963-1965 
 The individual responsible for institutionalizing Arabization was Algeria’s first 
president Ahmed Ben Bella (1918-2012), a former FLN combatant during the liberation 
war. Born in 1918 in Maghnia, Ben Bella came from a family of fellaḥīn who tended a 
farm not far from the town center. A contemporary of Hocine Aït Ahmed and Mohamed 
Khider, Ben Bella made a name for himself in military matters and quickly rose up the 
ranks of the FLN to become one of its leading spokespersons.63 After being freed from 
six years of captivity during the independence war, Ben Bella quickly affirmed his 
commitment to Arabism. In a famous speech he delivered in Tunis in 1962, Ben Bella 
stated “We are Arabs, Arabs, Arabs!”64  
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Ben Bella was formally elected president in 1963 and spent his first months in 
office working to silence his opponents. By the time his five-man Political Bureau drafted 
the 1963 constitution, he had effectively consolidated his own power to become head of 
state, head of government, secretary-general of the FLN, and had established support 
among the armed forces.65 He also quietly sidelined members of the ʿUlamāʾ from his 
new government by assigning them to posts where they would only be responsible for 
treating language, culture, and religion. Only one, Ahmed Tawfiq al-Madani, was 
permitted to serve as minister of religious affairs.66  
By the end of the war, it was clear that the francophone ruling elite intended to 
maintain the use of French even if they did not always express it publicly.67 During his 
two years as president, Ben Bella affirmed his commitment to Arabization meanwhile 
tacitly according French an ambiguous status until Arabization could be realized. On 
Algeria’s one-year anniversary of independence on July 5, 1963, Ben Bella outlined the 
importance of Arabization as such:  
I was pleasantly surprised to see our young brothers and sisters expressing 
themselves in our language with eloquence. It is a miracle, for it has only 
been one year since we were deprived of the classical usage of our 
language.68 
 
For I myself have difficulty expressing myself in this language. Many 
times it has happened, when our Arab brothers come to visit, that I must 
tell them that even though we do not know this language perfectly, it did 
not prevent us from feeling Arab at the bottom of our hearts. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 Ruedy, Modern Algeria, 200. 
66 Meynier, Histoire Intérieure du FLN, 671. 
67 Ibid., 690. 
68 Here, Ben Bella refers to the classification of Arabic as a foreign language under French colonialism 
beginning in 1938. See Taleb Ibrahimi, Les Algériens et Leur(s) Langue(s), 43. 
	   26	  
Arabization is necessary, for there is no socialism without Arabization. 
Our Arabism is not racism. For us, who battled against racism, Arabism 
can only be a way of life and thought (une mode de vie et de pensée). 
There is no future for this country without Arabism. It was, in fact, the 
goal of our Revolution.69 
 
The notion of Arabic as a language of “feeling” arose commonly in Ben Bella’s 
discussions on language. The underlying implication here is that even though Ben Bella 
himself had bypassed becoming Arabized, Arabization was necessary to ensure that other 
Algerians would be able to develop a deep emotional connection with Arabism. This 
speech also hints at another political concern among the ruling elite taking place in the 
wake of independence. Ben Bella’s refusal that Arabism constitutes a form of “racism” 
speaks to underlying uneasiness regarding opposition among some Berberophones 
toward rapid Arabization.70 Wary that Arabization would cause a political crisis with 
them, Ben Bella advocated a gradual program for Arabization and allowed Berbers to 
continue learning French.71  
One way to explain Ben Bella’s emphasis on Arabism as a “way of life and 
thought” is by considering the fact that he firmly believed in the importance of what he 
called “a sole form of political thought” (une seule pensée politique).72 This uniformity of 
thought, he reasoned, allowed the FLN to bridge differences and rally around a common 
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objective during the independence war. For Ben Bella, the fusion between culture and 
language might also then secure the uniformity of thought at the national level. 
Despite his frequent insistence on Arabism, however, Ben Bella remained 
undecided regarding the use of French and how to best develop a modern character for 
the new Algeria. Just one year following his famous “We are Arabs!” speech, he 
backtracked on this statement somewhat and reassured Algeria’s appreciation for the 
French language. On September 23rd, 1963, he explained the following to an international 
journalist:  
Elevating the level of culture is conditioned by the problem of language. I 
was misunderstood when I declared three times: ‘We are Arabs.’ Certain 
individuals were offended, and meanwhile it’s not about the color of one’s 
skin, blood, or race, it is a way of thinking, a philosophy. The problem of 
language is central. Socialism, too, is a culture. As long as we do not 
speak our language, a dimension of our socialism will be missing. 
 
We feel Arab, but our metric system is not Arab. French is an excellent 
vehicle and our French friends know the degree of respect we accord this 
vehicle.73 
 
Ben Bella’s comparison of French to a “metric system” reveals that while he viewed 
Arabic as an important cultural possession, French should remain the de facto “vehicle” 
of modernity. Arabic may be the language in which one could “feel” Algerian, but this 
did not preclude the use of French as the “vehicle” of modernity. In this excerpt, he sent a 
strong message to his contemporaries. While Arab identity had an important place in 
Algeria, it could not serve as the basis for the modern bureaucratic state he hoped to build.  
Perhaps more importantly, in this speech it seems that Ben Bella uses “the 
problem of language” as a proxy for discussing conflicting views on society, culture, and, 
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most importantly, politics. We see this in the way he uses the term “culture” loosely, 
implying it might mean language, philosophy, or even socialism. In line with the 
intellectual climate at the time, Ben Bella’s speech reflects the overall lack of consensus 
regarding the nature of legitimate national culture in Algeria. This speech appears to be 
more about how to ensure the emergence of a “sole form of political thought” than about 
language use itself. 
 
Remedying the Complexe 
 Under both Ben Bella and Boumediène, the political leadership’s first objective in 
the cultural domain was to counter the deep process of depersonalization that had taken 
place under colonial rule. In a broad sense, “depersonalization” referred to what many 
Algerian elite believed to be the absence of a genuine Algerian culture following a 
colonial occupation that sought to establish French culture in its stead. The most 
influential figure in shaping this process was Ahmed Taleb Ibrahimi (1932—), a 
politician and intellectual who became Algeria’s first minister of education under 
Boumediène in 1965 before transitioning to the role of minister of information and 
culture in 1970. Son of Sheikh Bashir Ibrahimi, Taleb Ibrahimi published numerous 
essays on politics, culture, and language throughout his career. One of the most 
outspoken proponents of Arabization, he saw Arabic as the key to realizing a new 
cultural world in Algeria that could one day even rival foreign cultures. 
In his original work De la Décolonisation à la Révolution Culturelle (1973), 
Taleb Ibrahimi outlines his vision for the “cultural revolution” and the necessary steps to 
achieve it. First published in French, the work provides extensive detail into the political 
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philosophy that guided his term as minister. Let us first see how he defines this cultural 
revolution:  
The Algerian must thus seize the richness of his past and he cannot do this 
without knowledge of Arabic. In this way, revived, sure of himself, rid of 
his complexes [ses complexes], he rises again to the surface to live with 
his time, to edify a culture enriched with all the acquisitions of the modern 
world, all the meanwhile defining his purpose by his history.74 
 
For Taleb Ibrahimi, the psychological vestiges of colonialism were the primary obstacles 
limiting Algeria’s national transformation. Intrinsically connected with these 
psychological vestiges was language, the key for Ibrahimi to freeing Algerians from their 
complexe.  
To understand what Taleb Ibrahimi means by the word complexe, it is useful to 
turn to Franz Fanon who developed the concept of the colonized subject’s “psycho-
affective equilibrium,” quite literally the colonization of the mind brought on by colonial 
rule. This condition, Fanon argued, can only be remedied through national sovereignty 
and the colonized intellectual’s reclamation of his past.75 In this sense, we can interpret 
Ibrahimi’s use of the term complexe to mean a distorted or insufficient sense of self 
which the elite were responsible for correcting. 
 Fanon is also useful for understanding Taleb Ibrahimi’s work because they both 
share an understanding of revolution as requiring continued struggle against the colonial 
power after independence. Fanon saw revolution as a process that shaped the 
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revolutionary’s “consciousness.” By undertaking the act of liberating the nation, the 
revolutionary himself was also liberated:  
We must not expect the nation to produce new men. We must not expect 
men to change imperceptibly as the revolution constantly innovates. It is 
true both processes are important, but it is the consciousness that needs 
help. If the revolution in practice is meant to be totally liberating and 
exceptionally productive, everything must be accounted for. The 
revolutionary feels a particularly strong need to totalize events, to handle 
everything, to settle everything, to assume responsibility for everything.76 
 
In Fanon’s understanding of national consciousness, revolutionaries first able to obtain 
this consciousness have the moral imperative to “assume responsibility for everything” 
on behalf their compatriots. This line of thinking effectively establishes a kind of 
universal consciousness as the goal towards which newly independent countries should 
strive. As we will see, Taleb Ibrahimi saw the Arabic language as the primary vehicle for 
connecting Algerians with their own universal identity.  
Taleb Ibrahimi’s notion that the elite has a responsibility to correct the Algerian’s 
complexe also suggests that he viewed modernization as a surgical process requiring the 
removal of any and all vestiges of colonialism to make room for what was righteous, i.e. 
Arab, Islamic, and anti-colonial. The idea here is that Algeria should turn in on itself to 
develop its own culture before re-opening itself to foreign cultures on better terms. As the 
above example suggests, the cultural isolation necessary to allow the Algerian 
“personality” to develop was not intended to remain so indefinitely. Once Algeria 
became self-assured in its own cultural authenticity, it could start to “welcome” other 
cultures: 
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A Middle Eastern writer, Naguib Baladi, advises us to be ‘welcoming’ 
[acceuillants]. But, he adds, before welcoming it is necessary to have a 
self [un chez-soi]. Which brings us to say that we can enrich ourselves 
through contact with others on the condition that we remain ourselves. 
Thus, our culture, by which I mean our education above all else, must be 
Algerian, founded on the Arabic language (profoundly rooted in the 
country) all the meanwhile remaining open to foreign cultures.77 
 
For Taleb Ibrahimi, looking inward to develop Algeria’s true self was a means to an end 
of integrating fully among foreign nations and their cultures. Like Fanon, Taleb Ibrahimi 
strongly condemned imitating the culture of the former colonial power, advocating the 
need for pursuing a unique chez-soi rid of colonial complexes. While Fanon advised 
newly independent countries against trying to “catch up” with Europe, he too envisioned 
detachment from Europe as a new path for humanity whose ultimate aim was “to walk in 
the company of man, every man, night and day, for all times.”78 Like Fanon, Taleb 
Ibrahimi clearly saw the achievement of this consciousness as a process that would allow 
Algerians to re-engage with others on equal footing.  
It is also important to stress that Taleb Ibrahimi saw his own role as protecting 
Algerians from cultural imperialism. He illustrates this most clearly in his introduction to 
the October-November issue of Al-Thaqāfa (1977). Published just four years after De la 
Décolonisation à la Révolution Culturelle, Taleb Ibrahimi stressed the ruling elite’s 
responsibility in combating cultural imperialism and reaffirming the goals of the cultural 
revolution: 
The battle, then, is not easy because cultural imperialism is covert, takes 
many forms, and is even tolerated depending on the circumstances. We 
can distinguish, in short, at least three forms of cultural imperialism. In 
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each one of these forms, we note that the responsibility for combating it in 
the third world rests in part on the collective citizenry, but on ruling men 
(rijāl al-qiyāda) to the largest degree.79 
 
As this quote demonstrates, Taleb Ibrahimi believed that political participation in 
discussions on culture and language should be limited to the elite alone. He implies here 
that authentic Algerian culture should reflect the policies and ideology of the elite, the 
rijāl al-qiyāda who, having transcended their own depersonalization, were the only 
individuals capable of providing Algerians with the necessary leadership to connect them 
to their so-called personality. Despite the populist rhetoric associated with his cultural 
revolution, Taleb Ibrahimi’s approach excludes ordinary Algerians from participation as 
well as other elite who might not agree with him. 
 
 Tarbiya & State Surveillance 
 Under president Houari Boumediène, Algeria saw the most ambitious and far-
reaching implementation of socio-cultural projects designed to achieve a broader, top-
down transformation of Algerian society. After ousting Ahmed Ben Bella in June 1965, 
Boumediène began reshaping political institutions “at the base supervised from above.”80 
Having appointed Taleb Ibrahimi to the important post of minister of national education 
in 1965, Boumediène’s active support for rapid Arabization provided a renewed sense of 
legitimacy for former AUMA members and their supporters.81  
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 Outwardly at least, Boumediène adopted an uncompromising approach towards 
Arabization that more closely matched the aspirations of the arabisant elite. He named 
1971 the “Year of Arabization” in which he arranged a series of conferences and 
publications dedicated to expanding existing Arabization programs and reminding 
political officials of their obligation to learn Arabic.82 During this same year, the regime 
held the “Conference for the Reform of Higher Education” at which Mohammed-Seddik 
Benyahia outlined “the introduction of intensive instruction of the national language for 
all students forced to pursue their studies in a foreign language.” This measure aimed to 
“form personnel capable of communicating in the national language by using the 
technical terminology relative to their professional activities.”83 Two years later in 1973, 
the National Commission for Arabization was created to make the Arabic language 
“efficient” and suitable for the development of science and technology.84 Another 
important development during the Boumediène era was the first national conference on 
Arabization that took place on May 14th and 15th, 1975. This conference, which 
Boumediène opened himself, proposed a “rational and scientific” vision of Arabization 
that clarified and reinforced the status of Arabic within government institutions.85 Not 
long after, the Algiers Charter of 1976 came into force which outlined the role of the 
“revolutionary power” in “speeding up” the process of transforming Arabic into one 
language used for work, education, and culture.86 
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 To understand the changes taking place regarding Arabization during the 1970s, it 
is useful to assess the work of Muḥammad al-Tāhir Faḍlāʾ (1918-2005), a former AUMA 
member and student of Ben Badis.87 A prominent intellectual and playwright known for 
composing plays in Literary Arabic, Faḍlāʾ also published several articles on the topics of 
culture and education such as his 1977 article “al-Thaqāfa wa Dawruhā fī al-Tarbiya wa 
al-Taʿlīm” (Culture and its Role in Tarbiya and Education). Faḍlāʾ’s article is worth 
examining in detail because he instructs the state as to what kind of culture should be 
promoted and how it should be implemented. 
For Faḍlāʾ, culture has a unique relationship to “civilization” (al-ḥaḍāra). At the 
beginning of his article, he is primarily interested in exploring whether civilization or 
culture must come first. Let us see how he defines these terms in his own words: 
Finally, the concept of culture emerged from the term ‘civilization’ (al-
ḥaḍāra)—a figment of knowing a cause by its effect, or knowing a noun 
by its adjective. Therefore, civilization is the result of what happens after  
the fusion of culture (al-inṣihār fii al-thaqāfa).88  
 
In this passage, Faḍlāʾ explains that “civilization” must come after “the fusion of culture.” 
While he does not explicitly state what he means by this “fusion of culture,” we can 
interpret this expression as referring to some kind of unity or homogeneity of thought. 
Not unlike the reasoning behind Ben Bella’s and Taleb Ibrahimi’s works, Faḍlā also sees 
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cultural unification as a precursor to political unification, or as Boumediène described, 
the “soul” to the Algerian “body.”89  
  Like many former AUMA members, Faḍlāʾ advocated for adherence to a purist 
and reformist Islam as an integral part of Algerians’ so-called authentic character. Later 
in his article, he advocates for an understanding of culture through the Qur’an, ultimately 
arguing that it allows for the integration of “spiritual” and “material” elements: 
Let us take, then, culture in its ancient meaning, that is uprightedness (al-
istiqāma). From this base, we can move towards spiritual and material 
horizons together. Without clarifying this or that, we can favor and limit, 
giving each thing its due. This will ultimately not harm anyone (lā ḍarar 
wa lā ḍarār).90  
 
Faḍlāʾ’s use of the terms “emphasizing” and “limiting” as opposed to “clarifying”—in 
other words, stating explicitly whether a thing is permissible or not permissible—sheds 
important insight on the approach the state should take to monitor and produce culture. 
He implies here that the state should take caution when deciding whether or not to 
outright ban certain aspects of culture in fear of provoking too strong a reaction among 
the population. This becomes clear later in the essay when he explains that closing 
cinemas and theatres “will never fix the problem, and the people—especially the 
youth—will not avoid this intellectual and spiritual nourishment….” Moving forward, 
he outlines the following solution:  
What will correct the problem is opening the right theater and the right 
cinema, one that educates and primes, prevents and convinces. What we 
say in the theater or cinema, we will also say elsewhere: in books, in 
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newspapers, in journals and publications, in televised broadcasts, and in 
the cultural and media arts (funūn al-thaqāfa wa al-iʿlām).91 
 
As Faḍlāʾ’ states, disseminating national culture will require the authorities to remain 
discrete in their efforts to control all forms of media and communication. From this claim 
arises an important question—what does Faḍlāʾ mean by “the problem?” The problem is 
that the regime and its intelligentsia, including Faḍlāʾ himself, feared criticism from those 
expecting a more popular and democratic approach to governance in line with the goals 
of the revolution. Given the authoritarian nature of the regime at the time of Faḍlāʾ’s 
writing, it makes sense that the regime would seek more obscure methods of control so as 
to not make public any thinking or behavior that might provoke dissent. What is also 
interesting here is that Faḍlāʾ clearly viewed “the youth” (al-shabāb) as posing an 
especially dangerous challenge to the regime. Why might that be? With an ever-larger 
number of students enrolling in public schools, the young Algerian population was 
clearly in the process of obtaining the same literacy, technical know-how, and savoir-
faire of the elite that, as former members of the wartime FLN knew all too well, could be 
used against the regime itself if not properly monitored.  
  
 
Beyond State Education: Tarbiya, Morality, & Self-Censorship  
One way in which the elite hoped to shape culture was through the emphasis on 
morality as a central component of education. Before proceeding, it is worth noting that 
while the two Arabic words tarbiya and taʿlīm often translate to “education” in both 
English and French, the word tarbiya can also be translated as cultivation, refinement, or 
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culture. Depending on the context, tarbiya can also be used to refer to a religious moral 
upbringing.92 In his 1977 article titled “al-Jānib al-Akhlāqiyy min al-Tarbiya al-
Islāmiyya,” Dr. Turkih Rabih (1932-2014), a supporter of Islamic education and long-
time professor at the University of Algiers, distinguishes the term tarbiya from taʿlīm to 
emphasize the importance of morality and piety in education, ultimately showing how the 
state can use morality as a tool of “self-censorship.”  
Rabih calls for the Algerian regime to consider education as tarbiya because he 
believes it has the potential to combine both abstract and material components. “Tarbiya 
for Arabs and Islamic education,” he writes, “combines abstract and material factors 
together in the personality of the individual, who works to build it in accordance with the 
philosophy of the educational Qur’an…”93 For Rabih, education should not be limited to 
the development of technical and vocational skills but should transform the individual as 
a whole: “the significance of the word tarbiya for Arabs informs the meaning of politics, 
leadership, development, reform, and refinement as we say.”94  
This moral dimension should be taught in state education, Rabih argues, because 
it is also the primary objective of Islamic education. In the following quote, Rabih 
prioritizes the development of the citizen’s ethical framework over the development of 
technical skills “no matter what the subject of the lesson”: 
The moral education intended by the Islamic ʿUlamāʾ means that it is the 
spirit of Islamic education because the first and superior goal of Islamic 
education is the refinement of morality and education of the soul. 
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Therefore, each lesson should be an expression of a lesson in morals no 
matter what the subject of the lesson, because honorable morals are the 
underpinning of Islamic education and its spirit.95 
 
In this example, Rabih highlights the importance of tarbiya for religious reasons. Yet are 
the benefits of teaching tarbiya over taʿlīm truly limited to religious objectives alone? 
The most telling aspect of Rabih’s article emerges towards the end where he outlines the 
connection between tarbiya and censorship. Tarbiya is necessary for the state because 
drawing clear ethical boundaries might serve to minimize the state’s need to enforce right 
and wrong:  
Islamic education, then, begins from within the individual in order to 
make the Muslim work with God on the basis of his feelings. He serves 
God as if he sees him, and from here, he does not need an external 
surveillant to direct him here or there because the surveillant already exists 
within himself. Therefore, he does not steal not because he fears prison or 
arrest, nor does he betray his country, because he fears God and because 
his conscience does not permit him to commit any sin even a small one.96 
 
The idea that the citizen could serve as his or her own “surveillant” illuminates how 
education, religion, and language became entangled in a comprehensive state-produced 
value system whereby citizens were expected to abide by the rules set in place by the 
political leadership. Brand has described how since the 1960s, the Algerian political 
leadership instrumentalized an “Arab-Islamic essence of the people” in attempt to bridge 
political divisions and ensure regime stability.97 This process was designed to work such 
that a “homogenous” cultural-religious identity rooted in Islamic terms would ensure 
continued support for socialist development. In a similar sense, we see that many elite 
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such as Taleb Ibrahimi, Faḍlāʾ, and Rabih argued for an Arabo-Islamic identity to ensure 
national unity. They thus understood the purpose of education to be the transmission of a 
new culture that incorporated religion, language, and ethics to secure citizens’ conformity 
to the authority of the state. 
 
Early Challenges to Arabization: Mostefa Lacheraf 
 
Hesitations about Arabization began to be articulated more frequently in the later 
years of Boumediène’s presidency, especially under Mostefa Lacheraf’s term as Minister 
of National Education (1977-1979). A prominent intellectual and writer who became 
minister of primary and secondary education in 1977, Lacheraf distanced himself from 
the active Arabization policy set in place by Taleb Ibrahimi. He believed that the 
government should continue favoring Arabic-French bilingualism until Arabic could be 
“reformed” to suit modern times.98 His 1977 article “Mushkilāt al-Tarbiya wa al-Taʿlīm,” 
which was originally published in French and translated into Arabic by Dr. Hanafi 
Benaissa, offers critical commentary on the relationship between language and culture.  
In this article, Lacheraf addresses “the question of education” (masʾalat al-tʿalīm)” 
with specific attention paid to the role of Arabization. His overall critique is that rapid 
implementation of the revolution’s goals (mabādiʾ al-thawra) resulted in the Algerian 
people’s “confusion (al-ḥayra) between the culture being pursued and the desired 
education system.”99 While he does not specify what he means by the “desired education 
system,” we can infer that his critique targets those elites who framed national culture as 
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a return to origins as did Taleb Ibrahimi, Faḍlāʾ, and Rabih. Because Algeria faced 
unique difficulties relative to other Arab states, Lacheraf argued, the elite was responsible 
for undertaking Arabic’s “reform” (al-iṣlāḥ) and “renewal” (al-tajdīd) in order to make it 
suit Algeria’s particular linguistic needs.100 Let us see how Lacheraf foresees the 
consequences of pursuing Arabization: 
The desire that one’s personality can be completed by using Literary 
Arabic, his national language, reveals many issues: that he always hopes 
there will come a day when the corrupt state of many peoples, having been 
barred from a culture that would allow them to complete elements of their 
national personality (shakhṣiyyatiha al-waṭaniyya), will be corrected. This 
desire is what has made some adopt perspectives marked by haste, unrest, 
and improvisation…Concerning Algeria, which has suffered from 
backwardness, and given that this backwardness cannot be remedied 
except through serious, precise work and avoiding falling into negligence 
and illusion, this aim to complete the elements of the personality has led to 
severe distress. Perhaps it goes without saying that those who have worked 
in this field did not feel this distress because of their excitement and lack 
of patience. In other words, this excitement has led, at least for now, to not 
feel the sense of genuine isolation we have reached because of obsolete, 
rigid, and lifeless values. All of this [has taken place] because of the sister 
countries (al-aqtār al-shaqīqa), who wanted the best for us, but who in 
reality, cannot help us in an objective way.101 
 
Here, Lacheraf achieves two things. One, he critiques defenders of Arabization not by 
attacking the value of the Arabic language, but by accusing Arabization of being 
misguided in its attempts to create an artificial personality for Algeria. Lacheraf’s 
distinction is unique for the debates surrounding language at this time, which often 
conflated the two terms so that critiques of Arabization as a policy were interpreted as 
rejections of Arabic as a language. Two, he draws attention to the state of frustration and 
confusion that had resulted from using Arabic to realize “the national personality,” an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 Ibid. 
101 Ibid., 19.  
	   41	  
ideal that Lacheraf subtly dismisses. At the end of the article, he poses a critical question 
not commonly posed by the elite during this time: “Does education necessarily arise out 
of culture?” (hal al-tarbiya nāshiʾa bi al-ḍurūra ʿan al-thaqāfa?).102 By destabilizing 
common ideological debates circulating at that time, Lacheraf asks his contemporaries to 




McDougall has argued that the Algerian elite’s claims of authenticity did not 
precede modernity, but were produced by modernity: “…an artifact painstakingly created, 
a doctrine elaborated out of the differences and divisions opened up in the social world, 
in political order and cultural hierarchy, in conceptions of civilization and science…”103 
Claims of a return to Algerian authenticity undoubtedly provided major impetus for 
pursuing Arabization as a linguistic policy. Yet as the works surveyed in this chapter 
suggest, much more was at stake than the mere substitution of Arabic for French in 
schools and government institutions. More than the pursuit of language planification, 
Arabization served as a struggle for the “mental structures” of Algerians as Bourdieu has 
explained: 
The conflict [over linguistic legitimacy] between the French of the 
revolutionary intelligentsia and idioms or dialects (patois) is a conflict 
over symbolic power that has at stake the formation and the reformation of 
mental structures. In brief, it is not solely about communicating, but to 
make known a new discourse of authority, with its new political 
vocabulary, its terms of address and reference, its metaphors, euphemisms, 
and the representation of the social world it conveys. And, because  
[linguistic legitimacy] is linked to the new interests of new social groups, 
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it becomes incomprehensible among local speakers shaped by usages 
linked to the specific interests of peasant groups.104 
 
While Bourdieu used the case of France in his own analysis, we can draw a parallel 
between how members of the Algerian elite across the ideological spectrum strove for 
linguistic unification as means to achieving political unification. In this sense, 
Arabization should not be understood simply as a way of expanding communication 
among Algerians, who, of course, could already communicate through their own spoken 
languages. Rather, as Bourdieu states, Arabization, “as a conflict over symbolic power,” 
aimed to establish a “new discourse of authority,” one that would ensure Algerians’ 
compliance with the goals and policies of the state.  
 Thus Arabization, far from being a way of reviving and restoring pre-colonial 
Arab-Islamic values, was a politically-motivated policy that capitalized on the cultural 
and religious authority of MSA to establish new channels of control and domination. The 
cultural revolution was meant to embody these aims. In making Arabization a tenant of 
national culture, the leadership transformed its own political authority into a kind of 
sacred authority where social and religious values became political objects of post-
independence ideological struggles. Like Kateb Yacine elegantly stated in his novel Le 
Polygone Étoilé, just as “Arab-Muslim” Algeria sought to “pacify” Berbers,105 so too did 
proponents of Arabization use language to shape and control the way individuals were to 
behave and think in the new Algerian nation. 
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Chapter II : Éducation à l’Algérienne?, 1962-1978 
  
The place of the Arabic language in the city we are building must be eminent. We must reconcile our 
country, that has been depersonalized, with its history and its past, that means, with itself…because we are 
in the process of giving a new shape to our country, because our country currently lives a socialist rhythm, 
your role is even greater. I call on you all, all teachers to participate effectively in all of the campaigns 
undertaken by the Political Bureau and the Government. 
 
For this, your congress must form a team capable of translating via educational policy the goals of our 
revolutionary objectives.106 
 




This section examines elite discourse surrounding Arabization in the national 
education system under presidents Ahmed Ben Bella (1963-1965) and Houari 
Boumediène (1965-1978). My aim here is to analyze how the education system served as 
a laboratory for competing economic and ideological interests around language and 
national identity. I find that the political leadership’s often ambivalent approach to 
language policy reflected contradictory economic, political, and ideological interests at 
work from independence onward. The education system is the ideal institution in which 
to analyze Arabization because it provided the regime an opportunity to shape youth in 
the image of the virtuous citizen—one who read, wrote, and spoke Literary Arabic.   
As Khaoula Taleb Ibrahimi has noted, education systems possess a certain 
symbolic value that makes them the ideal method for transmitting, reproducing, and 
imposing linguistic norms.107 Because the education system allows the Algerian 
government to determine what kind of knowledge is transmitted to students and how, it is 
important to examine the political leadership’s views on education during this time period. 
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The following questions thus emerge: How did the political leadership’s own experiences 
in French colonial schools or in the medersas and zawiyas inform education policy after 
independence? Which aspects of national education were open to discussion at 
independence and which were not? Given that the 1963 constitution stipulated that 
Arabic was the sole national and official language of Algeria,108 why did French continue 
to play an integral role in schools and universities? Finally, how did the regime make use 
of national education to shape new forms of political domination or maintain existing 
ones?  
 
Éducation à la Française: Mohammed Harbi’s Une Vie Debout  
 
To understand the place of language in education after 1962, it is necessary to 
revisit the legacy of French colonial schooling. Despite changes made to the academic 
curriculum after independence, the political leadership largely maintained the educational 
model and pedagogical methods left in place by the colonial regime. While debates still 
take place regarding the content of school curriculum, the expectation that the state was 
responsible for providing free public education drew wide support among the population 
from independence onward with school enrollments more than tripling between 1962-
1963 (832,143) and 1977-1978 (3,687, 652).109 What ideological underpinnings did the 
political leadership possess from their own educational experiences that might explain 
how and why Arabization took on a central role in national education after 
independence? 
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While a detailed history of the colonial education system is beyond the scope of 
this project, it is worth discussing what the colonial school was designed to achieve and 
how it came to gain a degree of acceptance in Algerian society. Fanny Colonna has 
provided invaluable insight into how local teachers were recruited and trained during the 
colonial period. In the 1890s, the regime opted to bring free schooling “to the families’ 
doors” in as many cities and villages as possible so that “no obstacle could impose itself 
between [the colonial regime’s teaching] and the universality of Muslim youth” (mettre si 
bien notre éducation à la portée des familles qu’aucun obstacle ne s’interpose entre notre 
enseignement et l’universalité de la jeunesse musulmane).110 Throughout the 19th century, 
most Algerians saw French colonial schools only as an instrument to obtain material 
betterment and they did not attract large numbers of local students.111 While the colonial 
regime provided some schooling to a minority of Algerian (predominantly male) students, 
it did not embark on mass education campaigns for most Algerians despite its so-called 
civilizing mission. 
After the First World War, the school had effectively “imposed itself as a social 
and economic necessity, a necessary weapon” and as such, many Algerians began 
demanding educational rights.112 How and why did this happen? Colonna’s 
understanding of the school’s perceived neutrality provides the most useful framework 
for understanding how this development took place. Although the school was an 
institution put in place by and for the colonial regime, it gradually distanced itself from 
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the colonial authorities by serving as an arbiter between the colonizers and Algerian 
society.113 In this way, education empowered an increasing number of Algerians to use its 
material and intellectual tools against colonial occupation as the FLN would later do 
during the independence war.  
One important characteristic of French colonial education that the Algerian 
government retained after independence was the teacher-student relationship that 
prioritized obedience, submission, and rote memorization of concepts and ideas. This is 
important to take into account concerning Arabization because French pedagogical 
methods defined not only what language was taught, but how: as correct French or as 
impure patois (dialect). Teachers were also recruited among the local population to 
promote French culture in addition to teaching basic reading, writing, and math.114 In 
order to recruit local teachers, training colleges identified Algerians who were the “least 
far” (les moins loin), in geographic or ideological proximity to French colonial society.115 
Once hired, teachers were expected to transform students’ moral qualities in addition to 
their intellectual capabilities: “What is in question is not the general scholarly formation 
of subjects, but their moral qualities, their habitus in its entirety.116 This notion of the 
habitus is reminiscent of how the post-independence political leadership conceived of 
Arabization not only as a language policy, but as cultural program intended to develop 
“the Algerian personality,” an all-encompassing existence that should be brought fully in 
line with the state’s conception of national culture. 
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In his autobiography, former FLN member Mohammed Harbi provides a detailed 
account of the contradictory values that the colonial school instilled in him from an early 
age. A well-known writer and historian, Harbi (1933—) was raised in an affluent family 
north of Constantine in El Arrouch. At fifteen, he joined the MTLD (Mouvement pour le 
Triomphe des Libertés Démocratiques) under Messali Hadj, eventually serving as an 
advisor to Ben Bella and finding himself in prison for five years after opposing 
Boumediène’s July coup.117 Below, Harbi describes the educational segregation he 
witnessed as a child in the colonial school where he spent time in both the section 
indigène and the section française: 
The primary school at El-Arrouch was comprised of two sections: one 
indigenous and the other French. In the French section, there were the 
French, certain sons of notables, and also Muslim girls since it was a 
mixed school. At the indigenous school, there were only Muslim boys. I 
spent three or four days in the French section which allowed me to see the 
difference. Everything was better: the classrooms, the tables, the materials. 
I only stayed there a few days because my great uncle gave my place to 
his son Ali, who was older than me: ‘Mohammed is younger: let him go to 
the indigenous school and my son to the French school to catch up,’ uncle 
Haouès said to my father.118  
 
Harbi’s account sheds light on the selective nature of the school and what kinds of 
students were encouraged to excel. In the case of El-Arrouch, it is not that children of 
Europeans and Algerians attended two different schools but rather that within one school, 
children were divided into two different sections based on race and class. This distinction 
is unsurprising given that in colonial Algeria, minimal elementary and occupational 
education was provided to the local population to ensure participation in the workforce, 
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not to promote the opportunities for socioeconomic advancement that Europeans 
enjoyed.119  
While Harbi concludes that his experience in the school had a positive effect on 
his overall intellectual and professional development, he cautions readers not to 
generalize about the colonial school as it tended more towards “communitarianism” than 
“individualism.” In one instance, he recalls how native students were required to cultivate 
the school garden every Thursday while European children were not.120 It is thus 
important to historicize the segregation of the school during the colonial period to better 
understand why education after independence was designed to provide advanced 
education for the few—children of the elite and students assigned to the bilingual track, 
often by chance—and basic competencies for the masses, primarily students assigned to 
the Arabized track. 
 Harbi also recounts how the colonial school instilled him with values 
contradictory to those of his parents. Describing the “rationality” of the school versus the 
“arbitrary nature of traditional norms and expectations,” Harbi concludes that the school 
and especially his teacher, Madame Chabbas, led him to develop a much different 
relationship with his own children than the one he had shared with his father: 
The French school and my father’s attitude forced me to break off from 
the spirit of submission. I realize this today. I grew up in a patriarchal 
house where my father accepted inacceptable things because of his father. 
Yet he would never tell me that what he was doing was good; he would 
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say, ‘I cannot go against my father.’ At school, everything had to have a 
rational justification, not an arbitrary one.121 
  
This passage attests to how the colonial school managed to insert itself between children 
and their families, forcing students to choose between traditional family values and the 
values promoted by the French school. As I will demonstrate later in this chapter, the 
post-independence leadership adopted a similar approach in how they positioned 
themselves between students and the family.  
Throughout the colonial period, however, educational opportunities and top-down 
attempts to transform students’ habitus were not limited to the French colonial school 
alone. The pre-colonial Islamic educational establishments in Algeria never fully 
disappeared but became “trapped” in religious institutions often outside of towns and 
cities.122 Education in the zawayas and Islamic universities across the Middle East and 
North Africa continually attracted Algerian students excluded from or unwilling to 
participate in colonial schooling. This development led to the emergence of the Reformist 
Movement led by Ben Badis, Bashir Ibrahimi, and other Arabophone notables in the 
1920s and 1930s.123  
Yet it would be a mistake to limit the way Arab-Islamic identity was articulated in 
the national movement to the work of the Reformist movement alone because the 
Francophone modernist elite in fact shared the same preoccupation with purity and 
conformity held by the AUMA. As Alain Messaoudi has shown, the division separating 
the education of the colonial schools versus traditional educational institutions was not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
121 Ibid., 30. 
122 Colonna, “Training the National Elites,” 286. 
123 McDougall, “Dream of Exile, Promise of Home,” 256. 
	   50	  
always as distinct as one might think. He has emphasized how French arabisants and 
local Arabophone intellectuals in the medersas and zawayas often worked together to 
reconcile traditional cultural and religious norms with scientific progress.124  
As Colonna has described, the French colonial school effected a problématique 
obligée sur le savoir125 that influenced all Algerian nationalists, AUMA supporters and 
non-AUMA supporters alike, transforming not only the knowledge that was taught, but 
also challenging the very meaning of how knowledge was produced and why. What 
constituted legitimate knowledge? What was the correct form of modern knowledge, that 
produced by the French cultural tradition or the Islamist-revivalist approach produced by 
the Reformist movement? What did it mean to be cultured, to be an intellectual? These 
critical debates preoccupied the political leadership following independence and are 
impossible to separate from the accumulation of knowledge during the colonial era. 
 
Mouloud Kassim Nait Belkacem and the Conceptual Tanwīn  
 
As was discussed in chapter one, the political leadership that arose out of the FLN 
at independence conceived of Arabization as an all-encompassing project intended to 
replace French, Tamazight, and Colloquial Arabic in all domains. National education for 
young schoolchildren constituted one means of implementing this ambitious linguistic-
cultural project. Yet Arabization could not be instituted without also equipping Algeria’s 
overwhelmingly illiterate adult population with basic reading and writing skills. At the 
onset of the independence war in 1954, illiteracy rates stood as high as 86% for Algerian 
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men and 95% of Algerian women.126 In face of these challenges, how was the elite to 
bring national culture to the masses? 
Algerian politician and intellectual Mouloud Kassim Nait Belkacem’s 1962 essay 
“Speak the Language of Your People” (Takallum Lughat Qawmak)127 provides a 
blueprint of what kind of language was to be taught and how. Having represented the 
FLN in Germany and Scandinavia during the independence war, Belkacem (1927-1992) 
served as the political director for foreign affairs under Ben Bella before becoming 
political advisor to Boumediène beginning in 1967. A lifelong defender of Arabization, 
Belkacem’s commitment to linguistic and religious affairs eventually led him to direct the 
High Council on the National Language (Haut Conseil de la Langue Nationale) two 
decades later (1983-1989).128  
“Takallum Lughat Qawmak” first appeared in French in 1962 in the government-
owned daily El Moujahid. It was later translated into Arabic by Hanafi Benaissa and 
republished in al-Aṣālah in 1975. In the article, Belkacem focuses on two methods of 
disseminating national culture to the masses: broadcasting and the public school. 
Broadcasting, with “its cultural and instructive message for the people in various 
domains,”129 would have an important role to play in realizing Arabization:  
We must prioritize Literary Arabic over Dialectical Arabic in the 
dissemination of news and other means via oral quotas (ḥuṣṣus 
kalāmiyya)...until the general tendency is always to prioritize Literary 
Arabic, until it returns to being natural, and we dispense entirely of the 
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colloquial, or it is itself erased. At least in its current sanitized form 
(shakliha al-qashtāliyy).130 
 
In this passage, it is intriguing how Belkacem articulates Arabization as a “return” to its 
rightful place in spoken communication. His interpretation implies that there was a time 
when it was “natural” for Algerians to speak MSA in the form he presents here. It is not 
pertinent for this study whether or not Literary Arabic ever served as a language of 
spoken communication—this question has been debated elsewhere. What is key for 
Belkacem’s text is the ideal of MSA he upholds. As Kristen Brustad has argued, what 
matters is not whether Classical Arabic was ever used as a language of daily 
communication but that its defenders, such as Belkacem, perceive it to have been.131 She 
has used the term “standard language ideology culture” to describe how the elite and 
especially nahḍawiyy language “reformers” in the 19th and 20th centuries sharpened the 
boundaries between correct (MSA) and incorrect (Colloquial Arabic) language, 
effectively solidifying new forms of social and political control centered on notions of 
“standard” and “nonstandard” (or substandard) Arabic.132 In assuming responsibility to 
rid Algeria of “sanitized” forms of Arabic, Belkacem reinforces his own authority to act 
as a kind of “language police” with the right and duty to determine legitimate language 
use.133  This idea illustrates the extent to which Belkacem connected MSA to linguistic 
purity and conformity to an imagined norm, viewing Arabic not as a tool of expression 
but as representative of speakers’ socio-cultural-political affiliations.  
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As one might expect, the school was the primary institution responsible for 
ensuring that students—and teachers—depart from using such “sanitized” forms. 
Belkacem argued that teachers should impose MSA on children “even during gym 
time,”134 explaining that because Algerian teachers had been forced to speak in French at 
all times in colonial schools, it was only natural that students should have this same 
requirement with MSA. He goes on to say that students should also be required to speak 
MSA with full vowelling, or al-‘irāb, at all times for, after all, “what is Arabic without 
vowelling?”135 (idha al-tanwīn mʿanāha al-ʿirāb, wa ma hiyya al-ʿarabiyya bidūn al-
ʿirāb?). He then justifies his claim by citing MSA’s parallels with classical Greek and 
Latin: 
Greek & Latin, the most revered classical languages, are not understood 
without the observance of grammar and precision; this is not restricted to 
classical languages, but can also be found in modern languages, some of 
which transcend classical languages in their submission to tanwīn.136 
 
We can interpret Belkacem’s use of the term tanwīn here both literally, referring to a 
particular linguistic feature of MSA, and figuratively, as “the observation of grammar and 
precision.” This unconventional use of the word tanwīn merits special attention—why 
might “the observation of grammar and precision” form an important part of how the 
leadership conceived of Arabization’s role in the nation building process? More 
importantly, what political and intellectual developments were taking place in 1975 that 
motivated the editors of Al-Aṣālah to translate and re-publish Belkacem’s text thirteen 
years after it first appeared?  
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Bourdieu offers a useful framework for understanding the relationship of 
linguistic codification to political power, suggesting that the school teacher serves as both 
a master of speech (maître à parler) and master of thought (maître à penser) who teaches 
children to see and feel the same way.137 One way of doing this is by teaching the 
“official” language—the standardized, written, and codified language—a  form 
conceived by the center of political power and then disseminated through education.138 In 
Belkacem’s view, if MSA was the language of the state, and if it could be taught in the 
most “standardized” way possible using al-ʿirāb, the pinnacle of “grammar and precision,” 
than all speakers who use forms of language not compliant with his understanding of 
legitimate standard Arabic would be effectively excluded from Algeria’s new national 
identity. Although he eventually backtracks in stating that students should speak in MSA 
at least “until the Arabization of education is complete” (illa ʾan yattam taʿrīb al-taʿlīm), 
his expectation that MSA with full ʿirāb become the de facto language of Algeria speaks 
to how and why Arabization became an salient ideal as well as a policy goal.  
 Beyond the standard rhetoric of Arabization’s necessity for revealing the Algerian 
personality, Belkacem clearly viewed the pursuit of uncompromising linguistic 
conformity through MSA as an important step to political unification. Perhaps more 
significantly, Belkacem’s text points to Arabization’s emphasis on grammar and 
precision as an important justification for its implementation. His argument points to 
what Mohammed Harbi has described as the “fetishism of the technical,” a mechanistic 
understanding of politics and society that, I would argue, also informs Belkacem’s 
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understanding of MSA as his emphasis on “grammar and precision” aptly shows.139 Thus 
as Bourdieu has suggested, it is important to view the officialization of MSA as a 
linguistic fabrication born out of the elite’s attempt to unify Algeria politically140 rather 
than the “revival” of a “natural” speech community that existed before French 
colonialism. 
 
Education and the Ideal Algerian Family: Rachid Boudjedra’s La Vie 
Quotidienne en Algérie 
 
 The relationship between children and their families became of paramount 
importance to the education system after independence. By independence, more than a 
century of social, political, and economic transformations brought on by colonialism had 
put pressure on Algeria’s traditional patriarchal and patrilineal clan-based family 
structures. In building the new Algeria, the elite hoped to take an active role in child 
development by designing educational institutions that would allow them to mediate 
between children and their families. In his satirical La Vie Quotidienne en Algérie (1971), 
Rachid Boudjedra paints a picture of how traditional family values struggled to adjust to 
the ideological demands imposed by national schooling after independence.  
 Born in Aïn Baïda to an upper class family, writer and critic Rachid Boudjedra 
(1941—) served as a militant and correspondent for the FLN during the Liberation War. 
Having worked as an instructor at a lycée for girls in Blida, Boudjedra went to France 
(1969-1972) then Morocco (1972-1975) to rejoin the Partie d’avant-garde socialiste 
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before returning to Algeria to teach at the university level.141 Shortly thereafter in 1977, 
he became an advisor to the ministry of information and culture and continued teaching 
all throughout the 1980s.  
His work La Vie Quotidienne en Algérie details a fictional family composed of Si 
El Hadj Ammar, his wife Lalla Fatima, and their five children who seek socioeconomic 
advancement for their family in the new Algeria. Divided into chapters touching on dress, 
religious practice, and urban life, Boudjedra highlights what he believes to be the “ideal” 
middle-class Algerian family’s inability to recognize the contradictions between 
maintaining traditional values and pursuing economic advancement through sending their 
children (the boys, at least) to school.  
 In Boudjedra’s text, the public school’s social importance first becomes apparent 
through its comparison to the Qur’anic school. Si El Hadj Ammar and Lalla’s young son, 
Fouad, begins his education at a local medersa prior to entering the formal public 
education system. His father, who had feared that Fouad would have a foreign teacher 
(Egyptian, Syrian, or French), is relieved to find his son is assigned to a young female 
Algerian, who teaches Fouad Arabic for two years until he begins learning French,142 
mirroring the gradual Arabization taking place in the 1960s and 1970s.  
Once he enters the public school, Fouad feels frightened, overwhelmed, and 
unable to make sense of the expected teacher-student relationship. Fouad’s hesitations 
towards the public school, however, do not last long. Having experienced frequent 
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physical punishment at the hands of taleb Si Hadi at the Qur’anic school, it is not long 
before his public school teacher vastly supersedes Si Hadi’s authority: 
Fouad, who had much respect for his elderly blind teacher at the Qur’anic 
school, donned much prestige on his new instructor. His father does not 
cease to repeat to him that he must obey his teacher at the school even 
more than himself! For Fouad, she did not only appear as a kind of 
magician. She was also the one who possessed knowledge and for whom 
the entire community attributed real veneration. Many Algerian parents, 
completely illiterate, felt a great sense of gratitude towards the person who 
took charge of the future of their children.143 
 
This passage highlights one important development about public schooling in the early 
years following independence. The fact that Fouad’s father commands him to obey his 
teacher “even more than himself” shows the extent to which the social prestige accorded 
education served as a powerful tool in persuading Algerian parents to relinquish control 
of their children to teachers. This mirrors how the accumulation of knowledge 
transitioned from the family to the school, a state institution responsible for for instilling 
national values and the basic competencies in reading, writing, and arithmetic needed to 
deepen the nation-building project.  
Etienne Balibar has written extensively about how the relationship between the 
school and the family in nation-building serves as a kind of “tribalism” where the state 
seeks to substitute “one imaginary kinship for another.”144 Through this process, the state 
instills a new kind of political authority over its citizens that had formally remained under 
the control of the family. The former passage in Boudjedra’s text exemplifies how 
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through schooling, the state can produce new relationships of power and domination 
between state and citizen, often inserting itself between young citizens and their families.  
 Boudjedra also depicts the school as a place of privilege and favoritism. Fouad 
and his two brothers, Ali and Karim, are assigned to the bilingual track where they learn 
Arabic, French, and English. Ali, however, has friends in high schools where education 
“is completely Arabized and where French is studied as a modern foreign language,” not 
as a core part of the curriculum.145 It is Fouad’s older brother Karim who becomes “the 
pride” (la fierté) of the Si Ammar family after having followed the bilingual track to 
become a chemist.  Boudjedra explains this as the result of the high degree of favoritism 
in Algerian society for pursuing technical specialties.146 This favoritism, Boudjedra 
argues, can only occur at the expense of devaluing other professions: 
This bias for science can be explained by its earning potential and the 
depreciation of literary studies. It is about a phenomenon that expresses 
the degree of mutation of the Algerian mentality at the same time that 
traditionalism remains tenacious…Karim is aware of the ridiculousness of 
such a situation that, in the long term, could provoke a grave 
disequilibrium in the sense that this infatuation with the scientific 
disciplines does not allow for a rational planification linked to the real 
needs of the country. It is as such that the formation of professors is slow 
and that the teaching profession becomes much more rare.147 
 
This passage implies that Karim, having been enrolled in the bilingual track by chance, 
was awarded the opportunity to pursue a scientific profession requiring competence in 
French, an opportunity that Ali’s friends in the Arabized track were no doubt excluded 
from.  
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Indeed, Benrabah has noted that from the onset of Arabization under Ben Bella, 
the military and bureaucratic elite typically enrolled their own children in “unofficially 
bilingual” schools to ensure for them “good careers in modern business and technology” 
all the meanwhile promoting Arabized schools for the masses.148 Given that Arabization 
was implemented gradually and unevenly, however, some students among the general 
population were assigned to the bilingual track at schools that had not yet been Arabized. 
The fact that Karim was able to pursue a scientific profession illustrates how, by means 
of good fortune, he was able to advance while many of his friends were not. 
 A response to the uneven economic and social development unfolding in Algeria 
during the first decade of independence, Boudjedra’s text indicates that by 1971, 
competency in French and the scientific professions were perceived as being hand-in-
hand. Thus while the regime professed its commitment to Arabization, it is clear that the 
need to develop suitable technical expertise proved a serious impediment to the 
immediate Arabization of all educational institutions. It is impossible to understand this 
ambivalent and often contradictory approach without first considering the prestige 
accorded scientific disciplines as Boudjedra proposed in his work. Despite MSA’s value 
to the regime as the language of nationalism, by the early 1970s it had clearly not 
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Challenging the Autonomy of the Family: the Introduction of Preschool 
 
 In the years approaching the end of Boumediène’s term at his death in 1978, it 
was becoming clear to the political leadership that the education system was not 
achieving its desired objectives. One attempt to remedy this dissatisfaction was the 
introduction of preschool in 1976. In his essay “al-Taʿlīm al-Taḥḍīriyy fii al-Niẓām al-
Tarbawiyy,” Dr. Turkih Rabih (1932-2014)149 outlines the regime’s justification for the 
measure and highlights its potential benefits. He concludes that the state would be better 
equipped to achieve its educational goals by bringing children into the state education 
system as early as possible, ideally between the ages of four and six. 
 According to Rabih, the regime officially introduced preschool in the 16 April 
ordinance and was to be implemented during the academic year 1976-1977.150 In addition 
to making education compulsory between the ages of six and sixteen, the ordinance set 
strict requirements for the development of preschool curriculum.151 Khadija Bouzoubaa 
and Nouria Benghabrit-Remaoun have summarized the ordinance as follows:  
According to the ordinance, the objective was to prepare children in 
kindergartens, nursery schools, playgroups and other structures for entry 
into basic education. By means of preparatory teaching provided 
exclusively in Arabic, this comprises teaching good practical habits, 
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promoting sound physical development, nurturing love for the country, an 
interest in effort and working in groups, and providing appropriate artistic 
education and elementary reading, writing and arithmetic skills.152  
 
The objectives outlined by Bouzoubaa and Benghabrit-Remaoun closely mirror what 
Rabih had argued in his essay thirty years prior. In terms of its academic curriculum, 
preschool would be used to “prepare the child to enroll in elementary and preparatory 
school” (al-madrasa al-asāsiyya) by teaching the principles of “reading, writing, and 
calculation.”153 It would also “aid the family in educating the child” by  “working to 
make him flourish through appropriate physical activity; teaching his senses (tarbiyat 
ḥawwāsihi) to reveal his intellectual talents; to teach him good habits; and to prepare him 
for collective life.”154 For Rabih, the introduction of preschool had broader objectives as 
well: 
The fact is that interest in childhood goes back a long way when civil 
societies realized the practical importance (khuṭūra) in steering young 
people from an early age to associate them closely with furthering the 
state’s political, ideological, and scientific objectives. Economically, 
however, this care and attention did not culminate except for in the 20th 
century. Because of this, some connected it [developing the child from an 
early age] with the golden age for the child.155 
 
Here, Rabih asserts that the regime’s motivations for instituting preschool were not 
limited to one factor alone—“political, ideological, and scientific objectives” were all 
intended to work together in the education of young Algerians. Yet elementary school 
(al-madrasa al-asāsiyya) was already intended to accomplish the objectives set out by 
preschool. Why, then, did the regime see interest in developing preschools? 
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Indeed, this interest in childhood and its psychological, intellectual, and 
physical life signifies the importance of the first five or six years of a 
child’s life and their profound impact on the formation of his personality 
and world view. The early childhood stage, or preschool as the decree has 
described it, is the golden opportunity to direct the child’s strength, to 
prepare him, and to place in him the bases of social education and sound 
morality…156 
 
To understand what Rabih means by instilling “social education” and “sound morality” in 
children during the “golden age” of preschool, let us consider who would otherwise be 
responsible for early childhood development if the state only made elementary education 
available starting at the ages of six and seven. Bouzoubaa and Benghabrit-Remaoun have 
noted that in Algeria, the family works in conjunction with the street and mosques 
(kuttabs and Qur’anic schools) to provide a learning environment for children prior to 
elementary school.157 The implementation of preschool, however, would effectively 
transfer the bulk of that responsibility to the regime. It is also noteworthy that the 
ordinance specified preschool would only be taught in Arabic. This meant that the 
education system could improve the chance that children would adopt MSA as their 
native language over dialectical Arabic, French, and Tamazight or any mix of the three—
an aspiration that has still not yet come to pass. 
 
            Conclusion 
 
Under both Ben Bella and Boumediène, the political leadership pursued a rapid 
transformation of society while claiming to safeguard “traditional” Arabic-Islamic values. 
As I have demonstrated in this chapter, the education system was central in disseminating 
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the so-called Arab-Islamic identity of Algeria that had been formulated by the elite. 
Despite the regime’s populist rhetoric of defending Algerians’ values, the case of the 
education system demonstrates how in practice, education demanded citizens’ allegiance 
to the state over other forms of authority including social norms, non-state sanctioned 
religious institutions, and the family. Through the education system, language became a 
visible marker of whether or not Algerians were conforming to the sociocultural model 
set forth by the state. 
Because Algerian society had come to see schooling as the main means of 
socioeconomic advancement in the early 1920s, the post-independence political 
leadership did not witness serious opposition to education in a broad sense. As the 
Boudjedra text demonstrated, many parents willingly entrusted public schools with the 
future of their children. That the regime designed public education to reflect their own 
nationalist ambitions is unsurprising. What is interesting, however, are the unique ways 
that education allowed the leadership to establish new forms of domination and maintain 
old ones, using language as a tool to enforce order and uphold conceptions of linguistic 
purity and conformity.  
Thus in granting legitimacy only to their respective “standard” forms, both the 
Arabic educational model promoted by the Reformists and the model established in 
French schools during the colonial period worked in tandem to devalue other languages 
as well as variants of those same languages. Both currents led to a situation where 
whether consciously or subconsciously, modernists and reformists conceived of language 
as a hierarchy, attributing cultural prestige and social status to the form compliant with 
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their own ideological understandings and treating overlap with the spoken form as an 
intrusion or corruption. In this sense, the education system played an integral role in 
reproducing the same Manichean trope of linguistic purity-impurity that defined the 
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Chapter III: Arabization & Ambivalence: Elite Critiques of National 
Language & Culture, 1978-1991 
 
Before Islam, it was the era of ignorance. The ancestors of the Arabs lived like your parents do today; they 
were Barbarians, they buried their daughters alive at birth. Then the Qur’an came, brought prayer, science, 
civilization. If you remain like your parents, you will be Barbarians and ignorant. So, say it…what are 
you?...Say it: Arabs and Muslims!158 
 





As the political, economic, and socio-cultural legacy of the Boumediène came to a 
close following his death in 1978, many of the questions that the revolutionary guard 
claimed to have settled in 1962 resurfaced as Algeria transitioned to new leadership 
under president Chadli Benjedid. Two decades of state monopoly over culture and 
language had not succeeded in unifying Algerians around the state’s understanding of an 
Arabo-Islamic identity, nor had it effaced ideological divisions within the ruling elite 
itself. By the late 1970s, Algeria’s linguistic landscape more closely resembled a 
multilingualism composed of two formal written languages, MSA and French, with 
Colloquial Arabic and Tamazight dominating day-to-day communication.159  
In this chapter, I assess the political, economic, and social ramifications of 
Arabization under the leadership of president Benjedid. Building on the previous two 
chapters, I demonstrate how the regime’s slow and uneven implementation of 
Arabization exacerbated the sense of frustration among the arabisant elite who came to 
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suspect that the senior leadership was not fully invested in achieving what they saw as a 
core goal of the revolution.  
This chapter has two objectives. First, I move beyond the claim that Arabization 
somehow caused the rise in Islamic fundamentalism in the early 1980s. As the following 
sources suggest, many of the elite who began advocating for more militant means of 
achieving Arabization saw themselves as the vanguards of an objective the regime 
established at independence, not because MSA itself made them prone to adopt Islamist 
ideas. Most importantly, this chapter will highlight how contradictions between the 
education system and the economy further polarized debates on Arabization along 
socioeconomic lines. As Luis Martinez has shown in his brilliant ethnography of Algeria 
during the civil war, Arabization became a salient issue for many FIS (Front Islamique du 
Salut) supporters not because of the French language itself, but “the privileges French 
speakers had on the job market.”160  
Another trope in current literature that I attempt to move beyond is the notion that 
populism and Islamic fundamentalism served as the only two points around which 
Algerian society was left to rally around after independence,161 implying that the absence 
of one or both systems would lead to rapid social disintegration. In this chapter, I show 
how the elite’s efforts to transform questions of language into ideological binaries across 
the political spectrum did more to exploit existing social tensions and cleavages than to 
promote national solidarity and cohesion. 
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Political and Socioeconomic Change Under Benjedid 
Following Boumediène’s death in 1978, two ideological camps came to the fore 
within the ruling elite. The first favored reinforcing the FLN’s control of the bureaucracy 
and was composed of the officer corps, the UGTA (Union Générale des Travailleurs 
Algériens), leftist students, some arabisants, and the PAGS (Parti de l’Avant Garde 
Socialiste).162 Conversely, the technocratic elite, the bourgeoisie, and members of the 
liberal professions saw an opportunity to depart from the austere socialist policies 
enforced under Boumediène and supported increased privatization and economic 
liberalization.163 In response to this impasse within the political leadership, the army 
appointed colonel Chadli Benjedid to the presidency in 1979.164  
Born to a rural family close to Annaba, Chadli Benjedid (1929—) made a name 
for himself in the FLN’s army division (Armée de Libération Nationale) from 1955 
onwards. In 1964, he became chief of the second military region (Oran) where he served 
until 1979. Throughout his time in Oran, Benjedid remained “on the margins” of political 
developments, preferring to focus on local military matters.165 Once elected, Benjedid 
pursued the progressive liberalization of the economy and a gradual opening of civil 
society until the 1986 collapse in oil prices and 1988 student riots led him to pass a 
referendum for moving towards political pluralism on February 23, 1989.166   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
162 Brand, Official Stories, 153. 
163 Ibid. 
164 Ibid. 
165 Cheurfi, Dictionnaire Encyclopédique de l’Algérie, 204. 
166 Ibid., 205. 
	   68	  
By the late 1970s, the regime had become increasingly aware of the higher chance 
of academic success for students placed in the bilingual track versus the Arabized track. 
As a result, socioeconomic advantages were increasingly distributed among linguistic 
lines with the Algiers-based francisant elite at the fore.167 Even the army proved 
conscientious of this growing gap as the following remark published in El Djeich in 
August 1979 demonstrates: 
In essence, the study reveals that approximately 96% of students in 
Arabized courses are older than the normal age [for that grade] and that 
two-thirds of these students come from families of the third socio-
professional class (lower income). Meanwhile, the parents of students in 
the bilingual track belong to the first and second groups. It is worth 
noting that a large proportion of students (62%) studying the national 
language come from families with a very high rate of illiteracy, while the 
bilingual students come from contexts in which French is used much 
more within the family.168  
 
Barred from more lucrative careers in business and technology, university students who 
had followed the Arabized track in secondary school often specialized in Islamic law or 
Arabic literature. This trend escalated throughout the late 1970s and early 1980s, 
resulting in an increasingly polarized political and social climate caught between 
reinstating a strong bilingual track for all students and calls from supporters of 
Arabization to complete the process and Arabize Algeria in full.  
This widening socioeconomic gap let to serious opposition in the form of protests 
during the first years of Benjedid’s presidency, two of which targeted the question of 
Arabization. The first protest occurred during the winter of 1979-1980 when Arabized 
high school and university students went on strike in criticism of what they saw as the 
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regime’s weak implementation of Arabization.169 Composed primarily of students from 
rural or recently urbanized backgrounds, the protesters criticized favoritism towards 
French speakers and lack of economic opportunity for monolingual Arabic speakers.170 
Fearing that Islamists would capitalize on the protests, Benjedid quickly Arabized the 
justice system and replaced Redha Malek and Mostefa Lacheraf, two secular leftists, with 
prominent arabisants Abdelhamid Mehri as minister of information and culture and 
Mohamed Cherif Kharroubi as minister of national education.171 In August 1980, the 
Ministry of Higher Education ordered the complete Arabization of the social sciences and 
humanities at the university level.172 
This arabisant protest was followed several months later in March-April 1980 by 
unrest in Kabylia where Berberophones across the region demonstrated against linguistic 
aggression towards Tamazight. The protesters called for the institutionalization of Berber 
as an official language as well as a language of instruction in schools and the media.173 
The regime responded with a violent crackdown, killing dozens and injuring hundreds 
more.174 Often referred to as the Berber Spring (Printemps Berbère), this protest proved 
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Re-Examining the Place of Colloquial Arabic 
  
 While instituting Colloquial Arabic as an official language never received serious 
consideration among the elite, a handful of prominent intellectuals nonetheless found it 
necessary to examine its place in Algerian society and its relationship to MSA. One of 
these intellectuals was Abdelmalek Mortad (1935—), a writer and long-time professor of 
literature at the University of Oran. Having received two doctorates from the University 
of Algiers and the Sorbonne, Mortad taught Arabic literature at the University of Oran 
beginning in 1970 before becoming vice rector in 1980. He was eventually appointed 
president of the High Council of the Arabic Language in 1998 where he was charged 
with implementing the law on the generalization of the Arabic language (loi sur la 
généralisation de la langue arabe).176 First published by the Société Nationale d’Édition et 
de Diffusion (SNED) in 1981, his book al-ʿAammiyya al-jazāʾiriyya wa ṣilatuha bil-fuṣḥā 
highlights critical debates surrounding the challenge of dialectical Arabic to the 
officialization of the literary register.   
Mortad’s work consists of two parts. The second portion, which comprises the 
bulk of the text, serves as a kind of reference work instructing readers how Colloquial 
Arabic can be elevated to the level of MSA. Each colloquial word is then supplemented 
with an explanation of that word’s relationship to the elegant (faṣīḥ) form of that word. 
To clarify how the work is structured, let us take Mortad’s assessment of the word rooster 
(dīk). Assuring that both the usage and pronunciation are shared between Colloquial 
Arabic and MSA, Mortad simply writes: “correct pronunciation (naṭaq ṣaḥīḥ) and correct 
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usage in our dialect.”177 In contrast, the colloquial Algerian Arabic word for “to rest” 
(rīḥ) does not measure up to Mortad’s understanding of literary elegance (al-faṣāḥa). 
Here, Mortad writes: “It means istiraḥa” in the “correct (ṣaḥīḥ),” “elegant” (faṣīḥ) use of 
the term.178 Other explanations attempt to correct not only differences in prononciation 
but lexical choice itself. Concerning the word ḥurriya, for example, Mortad reasons that 
during the independence war, many Algerians incorrectly used it to mean independence 
(istiqlāl). He then advises readers to spread the use of the correct word, istiqlāl, “until it 
becomes clearly understood to the Algerian people.”179  
 It is the work’s introduction, however, that sheds the most insight on Mortad’s 
ideological leanings. His introduction makes a case for why the study of colloquial 
Arabic merits scholarly attention, citing its importance to students of Islamic 
jurisprudence (fiqh) “so that they can understand all the roots of their language and what 
they contain concerning widespread colloquial dialects spoken on the street, markets, 
factories, and fields.”180 He begins with the following questions: 
What is the extent of our colloquial language with Literary Arabic (al-
fuṣḥa)? What are the origins of our different Arabic dialects in Algeria? 
What is the origin of the differences in dialects between regions and 
between villages? Finally, what is the value of our colloquial dialect 
(lahjatina al-ʿaammiyya) in relation to other colloquial Arabic dialects?181    
 
One of the most striking features of Mortad’s introduction is his need to justify himself 
for why Colloquial Arabic constitutes a legitimate object of study, going as far as to 
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apologize for any misunderstandings resulting from his work (fa ʿasā ʾan ʾakūn qad 
ʿadhartu).182 In one attempt to evade criticism, he makes sure to state that his study has no 
concrete political or ideological objectives:  
However, I would like make a comment regarding the release of this 
linguistic study. Research on one colloquial dialect does not necessarily 
mean calling for it, nor attempting to revive what disappeared from it. It 
also does not mean defending its use in writing—we want to assure 
(nuʾthar) that this book does not dissociate itself from the use of elegant 
pronunciations used in Colloquial Arabic to bring it closer to Literary 
Arabic. Indeed, most of the Algerian colloquial pronunciations are elegant 
(faṣīḥ), but the public (al-ʿama) corrupted it with their tongues, after which 
it began to distance itself from Literary Arabic in one way or another…183 
 
The fact that Mortad feels compelled to affirm he is not “calling” for the formalization of 
Colloquial Arabic shows the extent to which all language forms not adhering to so-called 
standard MSA had been thoroughly devalued in elite discourse. It is also interesting that 
Mortad shifts the blame for the corruption of Colloquial Arabic onto Algerians 
themselves. The implication here is that in “correcting” spoken language by substituting 
faṣīḥ usages for non-faṣīḥ ones, the distinctions that characterize colloquial Arabic would 
effectively be erased and thus make room for all Colloquial Arabic to become MSA. This 
linguistic unification of all forms of Arabic into the one faṣīḥ form would, of course, 
mark the effective “completion” of Arabization.  
 Mortad’s choice to measure features of Algerian colloquial Arabic against the so-
called standard of MSA marks a convention of many Arab intellectuals and writers who 
viewed and continue to view Arabic as a language with a “high” (MSA) and a “low” 
(Colloquial Arabic) register. To this, it is worth exploring the term faṣīḥ in more detail 
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given that Mortad describes it as the standard against which Colloquial Arabic should be 
measured. Sociolinguist Georgine Ayoub has provided valuable insight into how the 
meaning of this term has evolved throughout Arabic’s history. Whereas throughout the 
classical age faṣāḥa indicated clarity and mutual intelligibility, in the contemporary 
period it designates written Arabic only, “a harmonius and pure idiom” that excludes all 
other possibilities.184 This framework is precisely how Mortad conceives of Algerian 
Arabic. Colloquial Arabic’s commonalities with MSA lead him to believe that it is a form 
of Arabic, but its deviations from the standard of MSA make intellectuals such as Mortad 
responsible for correcting them to lift all speech to this pure, uncorrupted standard.  
In order to understand why he frames his argument in this way, it is useful to turn 
to the work of Khaoula Taleb Ibrahimi. She has described the tendency of intellectuals to 
attempt to erase differences between Colloquial Arabic and MSA, where the former is 
perceived as a deviation or corruption that ought to be corrected through the insertion of 
the “enshrined usage” of the word.185 This sacredness of MSA is what encourages 
intellectuals such as Mortad to defend it against corruption or impurity for which the 
masses are responsible. Because the “public” holds responsibility for corrupting pure 
Arabic, for Mortad it is the responsibility of the elite to undertake “a campaign” of 
literary elegance to correct it: 
The conflict then stems from the efforts of intellectuals and their loyalty 
to Arabic and its people. If they wanted to undertake a campaign of 
literary elegance (here, I do not say Arabizing for the Algerian public is 
already Arabized given their dialect, as we will see in the examples cited, 
and explain its origins and construe its meanings), I would say: if they 
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sincerely undertook a kind of campaign and persisted in it, they would 
truly reach revolutionary results. If one of us, however, is unable to 
master his own needed personal work, then how can he work for the 
group and the general interest? God has cursed laziness, weakness, and 
complacency.186 
 
In this example, Mortad makes two things clear. One, he critiques the hypocrisy of what 
is presumably the francophone ruling elite for not having undertaken their own “personal 
work,” the mastery of MSA. In using the phrase “they would truly reach revolutionary 
results,” he implies that the elite were not working sufficiently to fulfill the goals of 
Arabization. 
 Two, Mortad’s analysis is unique in claiming that “the Algerian public is already 
Arabized,” albeit in a second-rate and corrupt form. This is an unusual remark for 
supporters of Arabization at this time who saw the full adoption of MSA as a mother 
tongue as the prerequisite for being “Arab.” For Mortad, the responsibility of the ruling 
elite was not to make Algerians Arab, but to ensure all efforts were made to correct their 
spoken Arabic and raise it to the level of the literary register at which point the colloquial 
register. At this point, Colloquial Arabic would disappear and Algerians would possess 
MSA as their mother tongue.  
Mortad’s text can thus be read as a mild critique of the state’s insistence on 
“Arabizing” Algerians in the sense that Arabization was required to make them Arab at 
all. As we have observed, however, he is careful to affirm his support for maintaining 
MSA as Algeria’s sole official language lest his text be interpreted as a challenge to state 
policy and proponents of Arabization. This text suggests that the death of Boumediène 
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opened a limited degree of space in which the cultural elite—though not the public—
could pose questions to linguistic matters and state policy towards it.  
 
Bilingual Culture: the Writings of Mostefa Lacheraf  
 
 Among the more enigmatic intellectuals invested in the question of Arabization 
was Mostefa Lacheraf (1917-2007), a writer and politician who worked as a longtime 
critic of Algerian nationalism after independence.187 Appointed minister of primary and 
secondary education under Boumediène in April 1977, Lacheraf opposed accelerated 
Arabization and advocated for the maintenance of French in the school system “for as 
long as it would take to reform Arabic and ‘desacralise’ traditional culture.”188 While 
Lacheraf resigned from his post as minister shortly after the death of Boumediène, he 
continued to write essays on questions of nationalism, culture, and language throughout 
the remainder of his career.  
When writing his essay “La Culture Entre l’Idéologie Coloniale Dominante et 
l’Idéologie de Libération des Peuples” (1984), Lacheraf was serving as chief ambassador 
to the Algerian mission in Lima, Peru. In this essay, he critiques the emotional energy 
and “relentless search for a lost authenticity” fueling Algerian nationalism, a 
development he argues poses serious danger to Algerian culture and identity.189 He sees 
nationalists as having internalized the chauvinism, ethnocentricity, racism, and “spirit of 
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utopian redemption” brought on by colonial alienation.190 He compares them to colonial 
officials who attempted to construct a “Latin” history for Algerians, accusing them of 
pursuing the same policy of “assimilation” to their new dominant culture.191 
According to Lacheraf, one way in which Arabizers participate in this same 
discourse of assimilation is by adopting the “myth” formerly perpetuated by colonial 
propaganda that the French colonial regime successfully embedded French in Algerian 
society. This was not true for Lacheraf given that 88% of the population was illiterate at 
independence.192 He then sees the Algerian regime itself as the body responsible for 
spreading French after independence. “In an irony of sorts,” he writes, “in the span of 
only 21 years, Algerian children twelve times more numerous than during a century and a 
quarter of colonization learned French at the same time they learned their national 
language, Arabic.”193 What might explain this development? 
His critique of the ruling elite becomes clearer as his argument develops around 
the idea of re-Africanization (réafricanisation). Drawing on his experience in South 
America, Lacheraf presents examples from the writings of Angolan poet and intellectual 
Mário Pinto de Andrade. His understanding of re-Africanization aligns closely with 
Fanon’s understanding of national consciousness in postcolonial countries which he sees 
as “nothing but a crude, empty, fragile shell.”194 The national bourgeoisie finds itself 
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unable to achieve social or economic progress despite its “magnificently worded 
declarations” which Lacheraf views as “totally void of content:”195 
From this complete situation sparked by the manifold liberation initiative 
arises the search for and discovery of a new language in the same line 
with Portuguese, in which the urban masses participate as the sole 
revolutionary means of culture. Meanwhile, ‘the link with the country’s 
ancient cultures is not ruptured…and it is l’assimilé who should die at the 
hands of colonial culture.’ This honesty and uncompromising realization 
are not common, we can admit, in formerly colonized countries, who, by 
the force of things [par la force des choses], sluggishly accommodated 
themselves with colonial gains and the language of the colonizer without 
severing themselves from their spirit, nor readapting them to a new 
situation. Even when they were given the opportunity to re-conquer the 
use of their national language and recuperate their intellectual heritage, 
they did not introduce, for the most part, any new catalyst, any sense of 
creativity, any dynamic force susceptible to realize and spread this 
newfound culture with the people.196  
   
Like Fanon, Lacheraf critiques the ruling elite for having introduced cultural and 
linguistic stagnation under the guise of defending national authenticity. The “traditional” 
culture the regime claims to protect does not reflect the real social practices of the 
country nor does it express the “coordinated crystallization of the people’s innermost 
aspirations.”197 Rather, it disseminates an arcane interpretation of tradition that stifles the 
development of meaningful cohesion between the political system and citizens.  
While remaining a staunch critic of colonization, Lacheraf interprets the self-
awareness provoked by colonial occupation as a necessary step in Algerian history. As 
Kateb Yacine described it in 1966,198 Lacheraf sees the French language as a butin de 
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guerre (“spoil of war”) Algerians could use to create a future more in line with their 
social reality. In response to nationalist opportunists and demagogues, francisants and 
arabisants alike, Lacheraf wonders whether some parts of colonial culture might be 
salvaged from history:  
Yet it is also possible to state that the imperial need to access a language, 
even foreign on the part of the colonized who are deprived of their 
national identity yet inheritors of an ancient cultural tradition to replace 
their own, forbidden or declassified, pushed them in a sense to adopt, 
consciously or unconsciously, a compromise in which they attempted to 
reconcile, when they could, snippets (bribes) of a universal character and 
neutral contributions embedded in the civilization of the colonizer.199 
 
Through this quote, Lacheraf argues that colonized peoples can oppose their colonizers 
by turning their tools of domination against them. His understanding of a “universal 
character” serves as a subtle critique to the isolationist and exclusionary model of 
national culture promoted by the ruling elite since independence. Instead of “turning the 
page on French colonialism” by persisting in the search for a lost authenticity,200 
Lacheraf asks readers to reconcile “neutral” aspects of French colonial history, subtly 
calling for the maintenance of French as one of Algeria’s many possible tools of 
expression. 
Certain of the fact that the nationalist identity produced by the elite had not 
worked to give ordinary citizens an identity of their own making, Lacheraf concludes that 
culture in neocolonial societies is effectively “bilingual.” Engaging Argentinean director 
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Ezequiel Solanas’ film La Hora de los Hornos (The Hour of the Furnaces) (1968), 
Lacheraf cites the following excerpt from Solanas’ film: 
…Culture becomes bilingual, not for reasons of using two languages, but through 
the contiguity of two cultural modes of thought, one national—that of the 
people—the other, foreign—that of the classes submissive to external 
influence…201  
 
Lacheraf expands on Solanas’ claim by saying that “peoples and individuals have an 
amazing capacity to create cultural consciousness when challenging a foreign occupier or 
a dictator.” Here, he warns against the danger of trying to “assimilate” Algerians to a 
“foreign” and artificial identity, whether European or Arabo-Islamic. As long as this 
tendency continued, Algerians would continue to live the culture of the “people” while 
the elite would remain foreign and disconnected from the social reality.  
Lacheraf’s critique eloquently captures one perspective on the disillusionment and 
pushback against the cultural and linguistic endeavors undertaken in the first two decades 
of independence. He is careful to state that he does not mean to critique the nationalist 
sentiment, which he views as legitimate, but rather opportunists and demagogues who 
take advantage of this sentiment to manufacture an “excessive” form of nationalism 
embedded with the “ideological chauvinism and superiority of the West.”202 As in the 
remainder of the text, however, Lacheraf does not directly implicate the FLN or known 
members of the elite, choosing instead to use metaphors, analogies, other writers’ works, 
and subtle phrases such as “we can admit, in formerly colonized countries” to allude to 
Algeria. 
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“We Should Prevail in Arabization Even if There are Problems, 
Challenges, and Limited Possibilities”  
 
As discussed in the first two chapters, University of Algiers professor Turki Rabih 
served as one of the most vocal proponents of Arabization under Ben Bella and 
Boumediène. In the 1980s, he continued to participate in linguistic debates surrounding 
Arabization albeit with little confidence it would be realized. 
In his article “Algeria’s Efforts in the Arabization of General, Technical, and 
University Education” (1986), Rabih begins by reaffirming the importance of Arabization 
for Algeria’s revolutionary objectives. Yet in a departure from the optimistic tone found 
in his earlier essays, Rabih finds that given the current political climate, Arabization has 
little potential to succeed: 
The independence of Algeria on July 5th, 1962 was a definitive 
announcement to bring to an end the injustice that the Arabic language and 
culture had lived under for 132 years. It was an entry into a new phase for 
the sovereignty and dignity of the national language and culture. Thus, the 
battle for Arabization was and still remains among the most important 
battles Algeria faced in the first years following independence. And we 
should prevail in it. Even if there are problems, challenges, and limited 
possibilities (qilat al-imkāniyāt).203 
 
The fact that Rabih’s text analyzes the trajectory of Arabization in this way suggests that 
by 1986, supports of Arabization had begun to recognize problems associated with 
Arabization and were seeking answers to what might have gone wrong in its 
implementation. At the beginning of his text, Rabih inquires as to what the principal 
questions regarding Arabization were during the period 1971-1974. He highlights the 
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regime’s insistence on democratizing education as quickly as possible as a policy choice 
that had and would continue to have negative consequences for the fate of Arabization in 
Algeria: “There is no doubt that the democratization of education in this way will lead to 
a widespread process of Frenchification (ʿamaliyat faranasa) as long as the school is 
silenced by the French powers to become a tool for Frenchifying the Algerian people.”204 
Here, he likely refers to how the maintenance of French in the education system had 
made it impossible for Arabized teaching staff to establish hegemony in the critical early 
years of independence. 
 At the end of his essay, Rabih concludes by asserting the need for Arabic to take 
over all educational domains, including science and technology. Rabih presents his 
argument as a kind of warning regarding the linguistic situation in Algeria, calling on 
supporters of Arabization to persevere despite its challenges and obstacles: 
This, in short, is the situation of the Arabic language as the language of 
teaching and a tool for achievement in general, technical, and university 
education in Algeria, and the difficulties and problems the Arabization 
process faces simultaneously. As for the efforts to overcome it, we have 
included them with all objectivity and impartiality, so that the reader 
knows all the efforts made by Algeria in the domain of Arabization and 
making the Arabic language the language of education and instruction 
instead of French at the remaining educational levels.205  
 
Like many of the arabisant elite committed to total Arabization, it appears that by the 
mid-1980s the nature of demands regarding Arabization had not changed drastically. 
What seems to have changed, however, is the sense of confidence that the regime was 
committed to achieving it. It is also noteworthy that unlike many of the articles surveyed 
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thus far, which used discrete terms such as “bilingualism” or “foreign languages” to refer 
to French, Rabih openly admits that it is French itself that poses a challenge to the 
success of Arabic. Rabih views his own role as defending the continued relevance of 
Arabization and the need for it to be prioritized over short-term economic concerns. His 
article marks a shift in tone from the optimistic sentiments common among the arabisant 
elite in the earlier years of independence, showing the increasing sense of frustration that 
had accumulated by the late 1980s. As the following article by Hanafi Benaissa will show, 
some of the arabisant elite began calling for more drastic measures to ensure that the 
political leadership did not deviate from pursuing Arabization. 
 
“Refusing to Learn Can be a Good Thing if the Motivation Behind it 
Is to Defend the National Personality”: Reaffirming Arabization in 
the Works of Hanafi Benaissa  
  
 We can observe that by the mid to late 1980s, an increasing number of elites 
across the ideological spectrum were critiquing the regime’s reluctance to implement 
Arabization. While some elites such as Mortad accused the governing elite of having 
failed to implement Arabization fully, others such as Hanafi Benaissa (1932-1999) went 
one step further by advocating “non-state” learning to compensate for the deficiencies of 
the state education system.  
Benaissa is known primarily for his work as a translator, having worked with 
notable elites such Mostefa Lacheraf, Malek Haddad, and Ahmed Taleb Ibrahimi. He 
received his doctorate in linguistics at the University of Damascus, where he specialized 
in translation, and taught for many years at the Institute for Psychology at the University 
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of Algiers.206 A long-time translator and editor of numerous state publications including 
Al-Thaqāfa since the early 1970s, Benaissa intervenes in the debate surrounding 
Arabization in his own article, “The Child and the Dilemma of Linguistic Deficiency in 
the Arab World” (al-ṭifl wa muʿḍalat al-quṣūr al-lughawiyya fii al-ʿalam al-ʿarabi).207 
In this article, Benaissa explores the reasons for weak language acquisition among 
children in Algeria. His main concern is students’ engagement with the Arabic language 
in the public school system, which he views as being teaching-centered rather than 
student-centered.208 This approach, he argues, resulted in widespread “alienation” of the 
people from their own language, weakening the bond between the individual and 
society.209 For this reason, speakers result to “creativity” to express their ideas: “It is no 
wonder,” he writes, “that change (al-taghayyur) and distortion (al-tashwīh) get the best of 
his speech and writing.”210 
In Benaissa’s view, this change and distortion of the literary register results in a 
cheapening of language. In refusing to adhere to the linguistic convention or standard, 
speakers’ language becomes “common” and thus empty. This point becomes most clear 
when he compares common speech to a “bank transaction:”  
Perhaps it is useful to refer to the notion that linguistic conflicts resemble 
monetary conflicts. Thus today linguists have started to talk about ‘the 
transaction of the child in vocabulary’ (raṣīd al-ṭifl min al-mufradāt), as if 
this transaction resembled that of a person in a bank…and just as how in 
monetary inflation currency loses its value, making it cheap, so too does 
linguistic behavior (al-sulūk al-lughawiyy) devolve into chatting in 
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speech, twittering of the tongues, and empty words in everything written 
and produced.211  
 
The standard against which Benaissa holds Arabic speakers emerges most clearly in this 
example. For Benaissa, speakers should strive to use what is unique and rare—in other 
words, faṣīḥ—in all aspects of communication. To understand the importance of rarity in 
legitimate speech, it is useful to turn to Bourdieu and Boltanski who have argued that the 
possibility for amassing linguistic capital depends on the existence of a language or a 
register of a language “distinct” from popular forms.212 Linguistic capital in the official 
language, like any other form of capital, relies on a distinct group of supporters to enforce 
and reproduce its legitimacy.213 By denouncing non-standard MSA as “chattering” and 
“twittering,” Benaissa upholds his own legitimacy and authority. 
Benaissa then lays out five approaches a speaker experiencing linguistic 
alienation may adopt. One of these approaches, “refusal” (rafḍ), is especially noteworthy. 
This response, which Benaissa indirectly endorses, requires the speaker to turn away 
from the authority of the state to uphold the authenticity of his language and nation: 
Some might consider this approach to be bad. Yet the truth is that refusing 
to learn can be a good thing if the motivation behind it is to defend the 
national personality threatened by dissolution (muhaddada bi al-
dhubān)…perhaps the secret is that language is in danger along with 
religious danger and is characterized in the name of the people in anything 
sacred. It is as if language, in the urgent conditions that threaten its demise, 
used in the name of the people and their feelings, deposited in the depths 
of the human soul, remains there until the opportunity is made available 
for it when the smog clears and the emergencies end…to become as it 
was: the language of interaction in all different facets of life. This affair 
reminds us of what countries do to invoke destructive wars, when they 
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intentionally deposit their selves and their artistic legacy from national 
tradition into a safe place to protect them from robbery, looting, and 
disrepair. For what is more dear than language in the life of nations?214 
 
It is in this passage that Benaissa presents his most far-reaching critique of the regime’s 
approach towards Arabization. In describing the Arabic language as being in a “state of 
emergency,” Benaissa calls on his supporters to turn away from the state education 
system in defense of authenticity and safeguarding the national personality. Here, it is 
clear that Benaissa does not see the regime as a friend of Arabization but its enemy. 
Because the state does not take sufficient initiative to implement Arabization, Algerians 
are justified in challenging its authority. Finally, he concludes: 
It seems to me that keeping up with the times and confronting technical 
challenges requires realizing two demands: vowelling (al-ʿirāb) and 
Arabization (al-taʿrīb). These are two necessary twins, one cannot come 
without the other. For vowelling is the movement from the interior to the 
exterior while Arabization is the movement from the exterior into the 
interior. As such, one will realize a kind of harmonious linguistic 
adaptation (al-takayyuf al-lughawiyy al-munsajam). Thus both state and 
non-state education can aid the learner in Arabizing himself until he 
realizes the Arab nature of his personality, formed through vowelling (al-
ʿirāb min dhātihi) and the communication of his ideas and projects to 
others. For projects and ideas, if they are kept secret, are ruled by 
nothingness…215 
 
Here, Benaissa backtracks slightly to say that both state and non-state education can work 
together to help Algerians connect with their true character. In using vowelling to 
describe “movement from the interior to the exterior,” Benaissa implies that Algerians 
can conduct their own work outside of state institutions to become fully Arabized. Such 
an effort may work in tandem with the state, who deploys some level of “Arabization” to 
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shape learners in a top-down fashion. Once both processes are completed, Algerians will 
find themselves fully able to express their “ideas and projects.” Benaissa’s argument 
would likely not have been formulated the same way a decade or more earlier under the 
leadership of Ben Bella and Boumediène when most proponents of Arabization felt 
confident that the state would Arabize Algeria in full. His article thus reflects the 
tendency of supporters of Arabization at this time to explore channels outside the state to 
realize their overarching objective: the use of MSA as “the language of interaction in all 




In this chapter, I have sought to demonstrate how the arabisant elite gradually lost 
faith in the regime’s willingness to complete the process of Arabization. As this 
perception grew, the francophone ruling elite began to be seen as enemies of the FLN’s 
revolutionary goals. In this way, I have sought to show that the Arabophone leadership, 
many of whom would later galvanize Arabized students and graduates around the 
question of Arabization in the 1990s, were not distinct Islamist “enemies” of the state but 
the product of state discourse of Arabization set initially by Ben Bella and furthered by 
Boumediène.  
While promoting Arabization at the level of rhetoric, the elite continued to follow 
an “ambivalent” approach towards language in the school system. Having formally 
erased the term bilingualism from the school curriculum, French was taught as a “foreign 
language” despite its widespread use as a language of instruction. This process resulted in 
an “unequal scholarly bilingualism” where students identified Arabic as the language of 
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literature and philosophy while French remained the property of scientific and 
mathematical disciplines.216  
Thus by the late 1980s, the hegemony of francophone students and intellectuals 
among the political leadership indicated to many proponents of Arabization that the 
“national language” at the level of discourse did not align with the economic and political 
priorities of the state, the majority of which continued to operate in French exclusively or 
bilingual Arabic-French contexts. In this sense, the trajectory of the language question in 
Algeria had as much to do with the reproduction of social inequalities as it did with 
religious and linguistic ideology. As the 1980s came to a close, it was clear that the 
regime could and would not satisfy the demands of proponents of monolingual Arabic 
speakers that ran counter to the actual political and economic development model in 
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Conclusion 
 
 In 1926, Sir William Willcocks, a British civil engineer who had worked on the 
first Aswan Dam project, published his famous article “Syria, Egypt, North Africa and 
Malta Speak Punic, not Arabic,” in which he made the following remarks on the 
languages of the Middle East and North Africa:  
The indolence of Europe is responsible for the fact that though the 
language of Persia has had Arabic imposed on it and is still called Persian, 
and though the language of Northern India has had Persian imposed on it 
and is called Hindustani, yet the language of Syria is not called Syrian, the 
language of Egypt is not called Egyptian, the language of Algiers is not 
called Algerian and the language of Morocco is not called Moroccan…If 
Europe tried, for its own selfish ends, to keep these Mediterranean 
countries backward, could it find any better way than to encourage them to 
despise their own living spoken language and to laud to the skies their 
artificial literary language?217  
 
Leaving aside the generalizations and paternalism found throughout the article, Willcocks 
nonetheless made several key observations about commonly-held language attitudes 
among the Arab literary class as well as European scholars and officials’ attempts to 
force the diverse spoken languages of this region into their own conceptions of an 
“artificial” Literary Arabic. In Algeria and other Arabic-speaking countries, this disdain 
for the “living spoken language” has come to characterize the ideology behind many 
Arabic teachers’ approach towards their and their students’ mother tongues, treating them 
as “incorrect forms, faults that teaching ought to correct.”218 
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 This collection of attitudes comprises one thing both the arabisant and the 
francisant elite in Algeria have shared in common since independence: a disdain for the  
languages of daily communication. As mentioned at the beginning of this thesis, neither 
spoken Arabic nor Tamazight attracted serious attention among the elite to become the 
language of government and business. It is not that they were considered and then 
rejected—rather, they were hardly mentioned at all, as though they did not exist. Those 
who did broach the subject, such as Abdelmalek Mortad in his work al-ʿAammiyya al-
Jazaʾiriyya, did so hesitantly and with fear of pushback from critics. 
Continued pressure from proponents of Arabization to “complete” the process has 
led to a situation where the ruling elite periodically grant them concessions without 
genuine intention or ability to implement them. One example of this process was the Law 
on the Generalization of the Use of the Arabic Language (qānūn taʿmīm istiʿmāl al-lugha 
al-ʿarabiyya) which aimed to Arabize the remaining francophone state institutions, move 
towards the complete Arabization of university education by 1997, and punish offenders 
for noncompliance.219 In response to the sweeping victory of the FIS in the June 1990 
local elections, president Chadli Benjedid passed the law as a symbolic gesture to 
appease their continued demands for the Arabization of universities and the job market.  
Yet concerns for Arabization among the ruling elite fell away as the political 
crisis of 1991 developed into a violent conflict between the regime and insurgents. 
During much of the war, few individuals took serious steps towards the law’s 
implementation. As Aḥmad Nāshif has explained, concerns over the economy and 
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reshuffling of political officials between 1993 and 2008 led Arabization to be placed on 
the back burner, with the leadership continuing to delay its implementation in spite of 
continued political pressure to do so.220  
 To date, the language question in Algeria has continued to center on whether or 
not schools should continue to favor Arabic monolingualism or formally adopt Arabic-
French bilingualism.221  French remains the dominant language of higher education and 
business and the preferred foreign language among young Algerian students. It remains 
to be seen, however, whether French may see increased competition in the future from 
other foreign languages such as English and Chinese.   
 This thesis has also examined the role of language in the reproduction of 
socioeconomic inequalities through Bourdieu’s conception of language as a form of 
social and economic capital. As I discussed in chapter two, the majority of the 
Francophone elite bypassed existing Arabization laws by ensuring their children were 
assigned to the bilingual track. These children were placed in private schools such as the 
Cheikh Bouamama (formerly the Lycée Descartes), where French remained the dominant 
language of instruction, and attended the University of Algiers as well as universities in 
Europe and the United States. Some scholars have even argued that Arabization served 
the ruling elite’s tendency towards “elite enclosure” whereby they minimized competition 
for their own children in limiting the vast majority of Algerian students to the 
monolingual Arabized track.222  
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 It has been argued elsewhere that Arabization in Algeria resulted in an 
Islamization process, especially in the public schools. This argument often follows a line 
of argumentation that presents the Arabic language as somehow responsible for the 
violence committed by Islamist extremists in the 1990s. Indeed, Martinez has made a 
strong case for how supporters of the FIS in the early 1990s often cited the need to 
combat “French-speakers” and “communists” as the true enemies of Algeria.223 Yet as 
was discussed in chapter three, unemployed college graduates who followed the Arabized 
track more commonly lauded the lack of economic opportunity associated with Arabic 
than the use of French.224 My proposal in this thesis has been to place the polarizing 
ideology constructed around language at the center of linguistic “conflict,” not the 
languages themselves.  
 As this thesis has sought to show, it is not multilingualism that poses a challenge 
to national identity, but the tendency of elites engaged in debates on language to view 
potential steps forward in absolutes. The arabisant elite are largely responsible for 
blocking reforms of the education system that would make Arabic more accessible to 
Algerian students and make bilingualism a formal option. In 2002 for example, some 
arabisant elite and their supporters issued a fatwa against proposed educational reforms, 
accusing proponents of bilingualism of being enemies of Islam and forcing 
Westernization on Algeria.225 In a 2014 interview, Khaoula Taleb Ibrahimi described her 
perspective on the role some arabisant elite play in contemporary linguistic debates: 
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As soon as we enter into discourse on language, as soon as we enter into 
ideological representations, in the first sense of the word ‘ideology,’ 
meaning ‘what one makes as an idea,’ we see consensus break down 
immediately. This is often linked to positions of power. 
 
As a language specialist, I call on those who are determined to show that 
they are the defenders of the Arabic language to say: it is not by adopting 
this position that you promote the Arabic language. What did you do when 
you were minister of national education? What steps did you put in place 
to make sure that it becomes a real living language?226  
 
Taleb Ibrahimi makes an important distinction between what it means to support the 
Arabic language versus what it means to support the ideology the elite have developed 
around the Arabic language. These arabisant elite insist on students learning a kind of 
Arabic whose aim is the memorization of grammatical rules and literary conventions, not 
improved competency in written and oral expression. Moreover, they insist on accusing 
those who do not abide by their strict set of linguistic, cultural, and religious preferences 
as being anti-national, a tendency that runs counter to the historical and present diversity 
of Algeria. 
 On a similar note, the so-called modernist Francophone elite hold the bulk of 
responsibility for promoting the notion that to be “modern” was to be educated in French 
and French ways of life while at the level of discourse articulating national identity such 
that to be Algerian meant being a monolingual (Literary) Arabic speaker and an 
unquestioning believer in the “Arabo-Islamic” identity established by the state. Choosing 
to write in MSA, studying French in school, and speaking in Colloquial Arabic or 
Tamazight do not conflict on their own. When taken to symbolize the “essence” of an 
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individual or a nation, however, all three elements can, as what happened in the 1990s, 
convene to become “the strategic axis of a veritable trench war” around which language 
choice poses real-life consequences to perceived non-conformers.227  
 While I believe this study contributes to the current literature on Arabization in 
several ways, it is not intended to be a complete project or to propose any kind of 
“solution” to Algeria’s language question, if such a solution does exist. Its main purpose 
has been to explore the theoretical underpinnings of Arabization to better understand why 
and how language in Algeria continues to polarize the ruling elite and ordinary Algerians 
alike. An important objective of this thesis has been to show that what was at stake with 
Arabization was not a struggle over language for its own sake or the need to ensure 
communication between diverse linguistic groups. Rather, it was a competition for an all-
encompassing uniformity of thought that promised tremendous rewards in terms of 














	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
227 Omar Carlier, “Civil War, Private Violence, and Cultural Socialization,” in Algeria in Others’ 
Languages, ed. Anne-Emmanuelle Berger (Cornell: Cornell University Press, 2002): 89. 
 
	   94	  
Bibliography  
 
Abdulrazak, Fawzi. “Arabization in Algeria.” MELA Notes 26 (1982): 22-43. Accessed 
August 22, 2015. doi: http://www.jstor.org/stable/29785162. 
 
“The Algerian Constitution.” Middle East Journal 17, no. 4 (1963): 446-450. Accessed 
February 6, 2016. doi: http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/stable/4323641. 
 
Ayoub, Georgine. “Fasih.” Encyclopedia of Arabic Language and Linguistics 2 (2006): 
84-90.  
 
Baida, Abdellah. “Langue est Identité dans les Littératures Francophones du Maghreb.” 
In La Francopolyphonie: Langues et Identité (Chişinău: Free International 
University of Moldova, 2007): 34-40. 
 
Balibar, Etienne. “The Nation Form: History and Ideology.” Review (Fernand Braudel 
Center) 13, no. 3 (1990): 329-361. Accessed November 29, 2015. doi:  
 http://www.jstor.org/stable/40241159. 
 
Belkacem, Mouloud Kassim Nait. “Takallum Lughat Qawmak.” Translated by Hanafi 
Benaissa. al-Asālah, no. 25 (1975): i-xii.  
 
Belmessous, Saliha. Assimilation & Empire: Uniformity in French & British Colonies 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). 
 
Benaissa, Hanafi. “Al-ṭifl wa muʿḍalat al-quṣūr al-lughawiyya fii al-ʿalam al-ʿarabi,” al-
Thaqāfa, no. 98 (1987): 117-130. 
 
Benrabah, Mohamed. Language Conflict in Algeria: from Colonialism to Post-
Independence. Buffalo: Multilingual Matters, 2013.  
 
—“Language-in-Education Planning in Algeria: Historical Development & Current 
Issues.” Language Policy 6 (2007): 225-252. Accessed October 12, 2015. doi: 
10.1007/s10993-007-9046-7. 
 
—“Language Maintenance and Spread: French in Algeria.” International Journal of 
Francophone Studies 10 (2007): 193-215. Accessed August 22, 2015. doi: 
10.1386/ijfs.10.1. 
 
Boudjedra, Rachid. La Vie Quotidienne en Algérie. Paris: Librairie Hachette, 1971. 
 
Bourdieu, Pierre. Ce Que Parler Veut Dire: l’Économie des Échanges Linguistiques. 
Paris: Librarie Arthème Fayard, 1982. 
 
	   95	  
Bourdieu, Pierre and Luc Boltanksi. “La Fétichisme de la Langue.” Actes de la 
Recherché en Sciences Sociales 1 (1975): 2-32. Accessed October 6, 2015. doi: 
10.3406/arss.1975.3417. 
 
Bouzoubaa, Khadija and Nouria Benghabrit-Remaoun. “Pre-School Education in 
Morocco and Algeria.” Prospects 34, no. 4 (2004): 471-480. Accessed January 21, 
2016. doi: 10.1007/s11125-005-2738-x. 
 
Brand, Laurie A. Official Stories: Politics and National Narratives in Egypt and Algeria. 
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2014. 
 
Brustad, Kristen. “Standard Language Ideology and the Construction of Modern Standard 
Arabic.” Paper presented at the Workshop on Language, Literacy, and the Social 
Construction of Authority. 
 
Carlier, Omar. “Civil War, Private Violence, and Cultural Socialization: Political 
Violence in Algeria (1954-1988).” In Algeria in Others’ Languages, edited by 
Anne-Emmanuelle Berger. Cornell: Cornell University Press, 2002. 
 
Cheurfi, Achour. Dictionnaire Encyclopédique de l’Algérie. Algiers: Éditions ANEP, 
2004.  
 
Colonna, Fanny. Instituteurs Algerians: 1883-1939. Paris: Presses de la Fondation 
Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1975. 
 
—“Training the National Elites.” Translated by Gabrielle Varro. Historical Research 33, 
no. 2 (2008): 285-295. Accessed February 21, 2016. doi: 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/20762288. 
 
Courreye, Charlotte. “L’École Musulmane Algérienne de Ibn Bâdîs dans les Années 
1930, de l’Alphabétisation de Tous Comme Enjeu Politique.” Revue des Mondes 
Musulmans et de la Méditerranée 136 (2014). Accessed April 27, 2016. doi: 
http://remmm.revues.org/8500. 
 
Entelis, John P. Algeria: The Revolution Institutionalized. Boulder: Westview Press, 1986. 
 
Faḍlā, Muḥammad al-Tāhir. “al-Thaqāfa wa Dawruhā fii al-Tarbiyya wa al-Taʿlīm.” al-
Thaqāfa. Algiers: Wizarat al-Thaqāfa wa al-Iʿlām (1977): 73-88. 
 
Fanon, Franz. The Wretched of the Earth. Trans. Richard Philcox. New York: Grove 
Press, 2004. 
 
	   96	  
Grandguillaume, Gilbert. “Arabisation et Langues Maternelles dans le Contexte National 
au Maghreb.” International Journal of the Sociology of Language 87 (1991): 45-
54. Accessed January 12, 2015. doi: 0165-2516/91/0087-0045. 
 
—Arabisation et Politique Linguistique au Maghreb. Paris: G.-P. Maisonneuve et Larose, 
1983.  
 
Harbi, Mohammed. Une Vie Debout. Paris: La Découverte, 2001.  
 
Harbi, Mohammed and Gilbert Meynier. Le FLN: Documents et Histoire, 1954-1962. 
Paris: Librarie Arthème Fayard, 2004. 
 
Kashani-Sabet, Firoozeh. “The Swinging Pendulum: Linguistic Controversy in Post-
Colonial Algeria.” Middle Eastern Studies 32 (1996): 264-280. Accessed July 9, 
2015. doi: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4283827. 
 
Khanna, Ranjana. “The Experience of Evidence: Language, the Law, and the Mockery of 
Justice.” In Algeria in Others’ Languages, edited by Anne-Emmanuelle Berger, 
107-138. Cornell: Cornell University Press, 2002. 
 
Lacheraf, Mostefa. “La Culture Entre L’Idéologie Coloniale Dominante et l’Idéologie de 
la Libération des Peuples.” In Écrits Didactiques sur la Culture, l’Histoire, et la 
Société en Algérie, 47-68. Algiers: Entreprise Algérienne de la Presse, 1988. 
 
—“Mushkilāt al-Tarbiya wa al-Taʿlīm.” Trans. Hanafi Benaissa. al-Thaqāfa 41 (1977): 
13-41.  
 
Les Discours du Président Ben Bella. Alger: Ministère de l’Orientation Nationale, 1964. 
 
Mammeri, Mouloud. La Traversée. Paris: Librarie Plon, 1982.  
 
Martinez, Luis. The Algerian Civil War. Translated by Jonathan Derrick. New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2000.  
 
Matthews, Tanya. War in Algeria: Background for Crisis. New York: Fordham 
University Press, 1961. 
 
McDougall, James. “Dream of Exile, Promise of Home: Language, Education, and 
Arabism in Algeria.” International Journal of Middle East Studies 43 (2011): 
251-270. Accessed April 23, 2016. doi: 10.1017/S0020743811000055 . 
 
—History and the Culture of Nationalism in Algeria. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2006. 
 
	   97	  
Messaoudi, Alain. Les Arabisants et la France Coloniale, 1780-1930. Lyon: ENS 
Éditions, 2015. 
 
Meynier, Gilbert. Histoire Intérieure du FLN. Paris: Librarie Arthème Fayard, 2002. 
 
Milroy, James. “Language Ideologies and the Consequences of Standardization.” Journal 
of Sociolinguistics 5, no. 4 (2001): 530-535. 
 
Mortad, Abdelmalek. al-ʿAammiyya al-Jazaʾiriyya wa ṣilatuha bi al-Fusḥa. Algiers: 
Société Nationale d’Édition et de Diffusion, 1981. 
 
Mostari, Hind Amel. “A Sociolinguistic Perspective on Arabisation and Language Use in 
Algeria.” Language Problems & Language Planning 28 (2004): 25-44. Accessed 
August 3, 2015. doi: 10.1075/lplp.28.1.04mos. 
 
Nāshif, Ahmad. Taʿrīb al-Taʿlīm fii al-Jazāʾir bayn al-	  ṭarʿḥ al-maʿrifiyy wa al-	  ṭarʿḥ al-
idiyulūjiyy. Algiers: Kounouz El-Hikma, 2011. 
 
Naylor, Phillip C. Historical Dictionary of Algeria. 4th ed. Lanham: Rowman & 
Littlefield, 2015. 
 
Rabih, Turki. “Juhūd al-Jazāʾir fii Taʿrīb al-Taʿlīm al-ʿām wa al-Taqniyy wa al-Jāmaʿiyy.” 
al-Thaqāfa no. 91 (1986): 82-104.  
 
—“al-Taʿlīm al-Taḥḍīriyy fii al-Niẓām al-Tarbawiyy.” al-Thaqāfa, no. 36 (1975-1976): 
63-84.  
 
Reudy, John. Modern Algeria: the Origins and Development of a Nation. 2nd ed. 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005. 
 
Saada, El Hadi. “Difficulté d’Acquisition des Langues Scolaires et Crise d’Identité chez 
les Élèves en Fin d’Études Primaires en Algérie.” Doctoral dissertation, 
Université de Genève, 1983.  
 
Stora, Benjamin. L’Histoire de l’Algérie Depuis l’Indépendance. Paris: Éditions la 
Découverte, 1995. 
 
Stradling, Robert. Teaching 20th Century European History. Strasbourg: Council of 
Europe Publishing, 2001. 
 
Taleb Ibrahimi, Ahmed. De la Décolonisation à la Révolution Culturelle. Algiers: 
Société Nationale d’Edition et de Diffusion, 1973. 
 
—“al-Imbriyāliyya al-Thaqāfiyya: al-Summ fīi al-Dasam.” al-Thaqāfa 14 (1974): 5-10.  
	   98	  
 
Taleb Ibrahimi, Khaoula. Les Algériens et Leur(s) Langue(s). Algiers: Les Éditions El 
Hikma, 1995. 
 
Willcocks, Sir William. “Syria, Egypt, North Africa and Malta Speak Punic, not Arabic.” 
Bulletin de l’Institut d’Égypte (Cairo: Imprimerie de l’Institut Français, 1926): 1-
17. 
 
Yacine, Kateb. Le Polygone Étoilé. Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1966. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
